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Throughout the history of the American Republic, all but a
small minority of states have capped interest rates on loans to
consumers with usury law. But in the past twenty years, for a
variety of complex historical, macroeconomic, and cultural reasons, these rules have increasingly yielded to a new, largely
unregulated credit marketplace. While many different types of
businesses have stepped into this breach in the edifice of consumer protection law, payday lenders have been at the financial services industry vanguard. While payday lending was virtually nonexistent in 1985, by 2002 it exploded into an industry
with over twenty-five thousand retail outlets nationwide, more
than McDonald's, Burger King, Sears, J.C. Penney, and Target
stores combined. 1 Today this industry, despite spending millions on lobbying and public relations, 2 is at the center of an in3
ferno of rage and public controversy.
1.

HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE

ECONOMY 73-74 (2005); see also Rani Gupta, High Living Costs Help Perpetuate Poverty, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 8, 2006, at 1C (discussing the effect
that payday lending has had on the poor in the United States).
2. Recently, the Community Financial Services Association, a trade association of payday loan companies, began a multimillion dollar public relations
blitz to stem rising criticism of social fallout from their financial products.
Stuart Elliott, Critics of Lending PracticesAdopt a Harder Edge, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2007, at C6; Sue Kirchoff, Payday Lenders Craft User Protections: Voluntary Guides Not Enough, Consumer Advocates Maintain, USA TODAY, Feb.
22, 2007, at 1B; Susanne M. Schafer, Payday Loan Industry Acts to Quell Criticism: The Lender's Trade Group Plans Changes, but Consumer Advocates and
Lawmakers Remain Wary, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at C8.
3. See Don Baylor, Loopholes Allow Loan Sharks to Prey on Hardworking
Texans, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 16, 2007, at 9B; Robert H. Frank,
Payday Loans Are a Scourge, but Should Wrath Be Aimed at the Lenders?,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C4; Bill Graves, Legislators Try to Lasso Payday
Loans, OREGONIAN, Mar. 29, 2007, at Bi; Carrie Teegardin, FierceDebate over
Payday Loans, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 28, 2007, at Al; Paul Wenske, Payday Loans-Attorney General Seeks Law Restricting the Industry: Missouri
Demands Reforms, the Average Loan Has an Annual Interest Rate of 422 Percent, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 17, 2007, at C1. Even a short survey of the horror
stories typical of press coverage of payday lending gives one a sense of the intensity of the public debate on this topic. See, e.g., Bill Graves, Loans up the
Ante for Addict Gamblers, OREGONIAN, Mar. 18, 2007, at Al (describing how a

1112

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1110

Although usury law has always been a fertile field for legal
and economic commentary, recent payday lending trends have
stimulated a thoughtful new crop of law review articles. For
example, empirical pieces by Creola Johnson and Paul Chessin
paint a troubling picture of payday lenders systematically disregarding state consumer-protection laws and intentionally
manipulating borrowers into long-term debt traps. 4 Michael
Barr has explored ways the government might facilitate less
expensive financial services for vulnerable groups.5 Steven
Graves and I have demonstrated that in the absence of strictly
enforced usury law, payday lenders cluster around military
bases, targeting enlisted personnel and their families.6 Richard
Brooks has argued that government might temper the harsh
effects of payday lending by forcing or encouraging the industry
to share borrower repayment information with national credit
reporting agencies. 7 Ronald Mann and Jim Hawkins have argued that government policy should drive small 'Mom and Pop"
payday lenders out of business, instead facilitating large pay-

metalworker and Vietnam War veteran took out 200 different loans all at interest rates of over 300% in a spiral of depression and gambling addiction);
Diana B. Henriques, Seeking Quick Loans, Soldiers Race into High-Interest
Traps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.7, 2004, at Al (describing how a Navy petty officer
borrowed $500 at 390%, which then spiraled into a chain of loans with $4000
outstanding at interest rates as high as 650%); Cheryl L. Reed, The Wild,
Wild West' in Loans: Lax Laws Let Lenders Charge as Much as They Want
While Borrowers Face Triple-DigitInterest, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at
20 (describing how a single mother of three borrowed $1000 at a 521% interest
rate to deal with a financial emergency, which eventually resulted in a
$10,743 debt); Melissa Wahl, Surge Puts Payday Loans Under Scrutiny: More
Regulation Is Called for as Customers Struggle with Interest Rates Exceeding
500%, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 2000, at 1 (describing how a nurse's decision to borrow $600 to meet her child support obligations spiraled into $10,000 of interest of over the course of two years); Wenske, supra (describing how a WalMart sales associate with family medical problems began borrowing to save
his family home and ended up paying $10,000 a year in interest on twelve different loans).
4. Paul Chessin, Borrowingfrom Peter to Pay Paul:A Statistical Analysis of Colorado'sDeferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387 (2005);
Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
5. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 passim
(2004).
6. Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, PredatoryLending and
the Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday"Loans in Military Towns, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 653 passim (2005).
7. Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994 passim (2006).

2008]

USURY LAW

1113

day lending companies motivated by reputational constraints.8
These and many other thoughtful legal pieces are only one part
of similar debates raging in economic, geographic, sociological,
and public advocacy literatures.
Surprisingly absent from recent discussion is careful nationwide analysis of usury law, the body of law that most directly confronts payday lending's primary feature: high prices.
In the Western intellectual tradition, usury law has historically
been the foremost bulwark shielding consumers from harsh
credit practices. Usury law, "the oldest continuous form of
commercial regulation," dates back to the earliest recorded civilizations, and continues to constrain payday lending in many
American states.9 While usury law has generated copious legal
analyses at various times in our country such as the late 1960s
and early 1970s, 10 the explosion of payday lending around the
country nevertheless prompts several unanswered questions.
Precisely how has our usury law changed to allow the growth of
8. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV.
855 passim (2007).
9. Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for
Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 151-54 (1988).
10. See, e.g., Douglas V. Austin & David A. Lindsley, Ohio Usury Ceiling
and Residential Real Estate Development, 4 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON.
ASS'N J. 83 (1976); Marion Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The
Usury Headache, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 819 (1968); Rudolph C. Blitz & Millard F. Long, The Economics of Usury Regulation, 73 J. POL. ECON. 608 (1965);
William J. Boyes & Nancy Roberts, Economic Effects of Usury Laws in Arizona, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35; Barbara A. Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-CreditProblems, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 409 (1967);
Carl Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23 BUS.
LAW. 931 (1968); S. Hugh High, Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas-A Rejoinder by an Economist, 50 TEX. L. REV. 463 (1972); Robert W. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REV. 81
(1967); Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for
Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 441 (1967); Robert L. Jordan
& William D. Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
387 (1968); Michael Kawaja, The Case Against Regulating Consumer Credit
Charges, 5 AM. BUS. L.J. 319 (1967); Homer Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-OrientedViewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1968); Gene C.
Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent Simple: The Arkansas Case, 1968 U.
ILL. L.F. 592; James R. Ostas, Effects of Usury Ceilings in the Mortgage Market, 31 J. FIN. 821 (1976); Philip K. Robins, The Effects of State Usury Ceilings
on Single Family Homebuilding, 29 J. FIN. 227 (1974); Robert P. Shay, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
491 (1969); William D. Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27 STAN. L. REV. 951 (1975); Ronald W. Del Sesto, Comment, Should
Usury Statutes Be Used to Solve the Instalment Sales "Problem'?,5 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 389 (1964); An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury
Law: 'With FriendsLike That...," 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 544.
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payday lending throughout the country? Why are usury laws
written they way that they are? Do the changes in usury law
tell us anything interesting about how law generally and consumer law in particular is made? And, can careful textual analysis of usury statutes provide useful guidance to policy makers
and to the public, which must ultimately pass judgment on the
national debate over predatory lending? This Article is the first
research that systematically categorizes, analyzes, and measures state usury statutes with an eye toward answering these
questions.
Accordingly, this Article presents an empirical analysis of
all fifty states' usury laws in two time periods: 1965 and the
present. A unique data set was created based on a careful mathematical and legal analysis of each state's usury statute.
First, the study calculated the highest permissible price of a
typical payday loan under each state's usury law. These prices
were then translated into an annual percentage rate format following the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) cost-of-credit
disclosure guidelines. Unlike state usury laws, which use a confusing variety of methods for calculating credit prices, the TILA
prescribes one uniform, relatively consistent measuring stick
for comparing the cost of various forms of credit. Although the
TILA requires that all creditors give loan applicants uniform
federal price disclosures, it does not require that state legislatures use this federal terminology in state laws. Nevertheless,
this study provides a snapshot of what terms state legislatures
would have written into law if they had used the uniform federal terminology for expressing their state credit price caps. In
doing so, this Article suggests a classification of six different
basic methods of capping credit prices used by legislatures in
the states and time periods studied. Furthermore, this study
creates a new method of measuring how misleading a state
usury law is. That is, it compares how each state legislature
describes its most expensive permissible payday loan, with how
that loan is characterized under federal price-disclosure law. It
a new financial concept that I label
does so by suggesting
"salience distortion."11 For purposes of this Article, salience dis11. While the concept of salience distortion is my own, the importance of
salience as a feature of analysis of consumer decision making was perhaps
best championed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. See, e.g., Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974), reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 11th ed. 1991)
("In addition to familiarity, there are other factors, such as salience, which af-

20081

USURY LAW

1115

tortion is the absolute value of the difference between the annual percentage rate of a usury statute's most expensive permissible loan and the most prominent, or salient, number
ten in the statutory language limiting the price of the loan. 12
Using this concept, the study develops a scale variable that
measures the extent to which the most salient price term in
any given state usury law underemphasizes or overemphasizes
the true price of credit. While in this Article I use salience distortion in the context of credit pricing, this new theoretical concept may prove useful not only to consumer and commercial
law scholars, but also to any scholars studying legislative misuse of numeric information. Potential future applications of
this theory include environmental law, tax law, and budget
analysis.
Although this Article methodologically relies on the federal
TILA as a tool for evaluating usury laws, the intellectual contribution of this piece is less about truth-in-lending than it is
about truth-in-legislation. This Article presents three empirical
findings: since 1965 usury law has become more lax, more polarized, and (perhaps most interestingly) more misleading. These
empirical conclusions give rise to several deeper insights. First,
these findings suggest that the language in current state usury
laws is not chosen because it helpfully describes some expectation of commercial behavior. Rather, legislatures have chosen
the language of most current credit price caps because it
sounds in an ancient moral tradition-a mythology of sortsthat roughly delineates popular perception of moral and immoral interest rates.
Second, these findings should serve as compelling evidence
of the power of what behavioral economists call "framing effects." This study demonstrates that states that have legalized
triple-digit annual percentage rate consumer loans for the
working poor use small and misleading numbers in their legal
texts to do so. This suggests that political leaders understand
what many traditional neoliberal economists apparently do not.
In the real world how a value is described can be much more
important than the value itself. Many state legislatures use
fect the retrievability of instances."); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economists, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1468
(2003) (revised lecture accepting Nobel prize in economics) ("[T]he likelihood
that the subject will detect a mis-weighting of some aspect of the information
depends on the salience of cues to the relevance of that factor .. " (emphasis
added)).
12. For further elaboration of this concept, see infra Part II.B.
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small, innocuous numbers in usury law because they are attempting to minimize the public and media outcry over their
decision to legalize triple-digit interest rate loans.
Finally, this Article raises a surprising point about the nature of commercial regulation in a federal system. For years the
financial services industry has complained about the high costs
of complying with the patchwork of nonuniform consumer protection laws adopted by each state. But, variation in the degree
to which credit prices are capped is not what makes state-based
regulation costly. Rather it is the tremendous variety and ambiguity of methodologies used by states to calculate those price
caps that makes compliance difficult. Ironically, it has been
credit industry lobbyists who, state-by-state, have built a host
of exceptions (and exceptions to exceptions) into the financial
methodology of usury law-all with an eye toward driving up
maximum credit prices without appearing to do so-that
created the high costs of nonuniformity.
Part I of this Article provides a concise background discussion of American usury law and the payday lending industry.
Part II sets out the methodology of this piece, including both a
basic description of the financial and accounting concepts necessary to measure the effect of usury law on typical payday
loans and an exposition of the salience distortion concept. Part
III presents empirical findings. Parts IV and V analyze these
findings and offer policy recommendations.
I. HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?
Usury law has exerted significant influence over the development of the American financial services industry. Section A
of this Part provides a short description of the evolution of
American usury law. Section B introduces the payday lending
industry.
A. USURY LAW IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION

As a nation, America has historically been deeply committed to usury law. This commitment sounds, in an ancient moral
tradition, skeptical of the advisability of high-cost loans to
those with limited means. The immediate forbearers of American usury law were English, the Statute of Anne in particular,
which capped interest rates with a simple nominal annual rate
of 5%.13 English usury law was a product of a theological view
13.

Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest, 1713, s Ann., c. 16 (Eng.).
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of the moral limits of acceptable lending practices. 14 While
Charlemagne and many other early medieval papal and feudal
leaders prohibited taking any interest at all, in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries many voices in the Catholic Church
settled on a 5% limit. 15 In 1461, Pope Paul II gave his tacit approval to charitable pawnshops to charge a 6% simple nominal
annual rate. 16 Protestant reformers, such as Martin Luther,
argued more explicitly that interest rates of 5%-6% were mor17
al, and that even 8% was permissible in some cases.
The first American usury laws grew directly out of shared
public consciousness and acceptance of these specific numbers
handed down by their moral traditions. The first American
usury law, adopted by the Massachusetts colony in 1641, predates the U.S. Constitution by nearly 150 years.18 That statute
echoed Luther's position, limiting rates to no more than 8% per
annum. 19 While the thirteen original American states were divided on many legal issues, as illustrated in Table 1, infra, they
unanimously adopted usury laws capping interest rates. Early
American usury laws were all written in clear terms, specifying
a maximum simple nominal annual interest rate. 20 These seminal American statutes were undiluted, trim, and perhaps
even elegant in comparison to contemporary statutes that employ a variety of different types of interest rates and include a
host of exceptions for various fees and different types of lenders. 21
14. See NORMAN JONES, GOD AND THE MONEYLENDERS: USURY AND LAW
IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 47-48 (1989).
15. See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES
78, 82 (4th ed. 2005).
16. See id. at 76.
17. See id. at 77.
18. See RANSOM H. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY, PAWNS OR
PLEDGES, AND MARITIME LOANS 50 (1891).

19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Stovall v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 722 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.
1984) ("[Tjhe general American rule [is] that when interest is allowable, it is to
be computed on a simple rather than compound basis in the absence of express
authorization otherwise."); Stricklin v. Cooper, 55 Miss. 624, 624 (1878) (holding that it is impermissible to charge interest on interest); Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 543 A.2d 1320, 1323-24 (Vt. 1988) ("Simple
interest has long been the common law method of calculating interest on a
damages award in this state."); Flannery v. Flannery, 5 A. 507, 508-10 (Vt.
1886) (discussing the calculation of interest rates).
21.

See, e.g., HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A

NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 287-88 (2003) (stating that all early American banks
accepted the limits of usury law as a matter of course).
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22
Table 1. State Usury Limits at Independence

State

Maximum Annual Rate (%)

Year Adopted

Connecticut

6

1718

Delaware

6

1759

Georgia

8

1759

Maryland

6

1692

Massachusetts

8

1641

New Hampshire b

6

1791

New Jersey

7

1738

New York

7

1737

North Carolina

6

1741

Pennsylvania

6

1700

Rhode Island

6

1767

South Carolina

8

1748

Virginia

5

1734

o

Loans payable in tobacco or other property were capped at 8%.
b New Hampshire adopted its first usury statute after independence.

The public spirit behind these rules is perhaps best exemplified by the thinking of America's '"first Great Man of Letters."' 23 In the preface to the twenty-fifth anniversary issue of

Poor Richard's Almanac, Benjamin Franklin expressed the profound skepticism of the social and moral consequences of the
consumer over indebtedness generally accepted by Colonial
America:
[T]hink what you do when you run in debt; you give to another power
over your liberty. If you cannot pay at the time, you will be ashamed
to see your creditor; you will be in fear when you speak to him; you
will make poor pitiful sneaking excuses, and by degrees come to lose
your veracity, and sink into base downright lying; for, as Poor Richard
says, the second vice is lying, the first is running in debt. ... When
you have got your bargain, you may, perhaps, think little of payment;
but creditors, Poor Richard tells us, have better memories than debtors; and in another place says, creditorsare a superstitioussect, great
observers of set days and times. The day comes round before you are
aware, and the demand is made before you are prepared to satisfy it,
or if you bear your debt in mind, the term which at first seemed so
long will, as it lessens, appear extremely short. Time will seem, to
have added wings to his heels as well as shoulders. Those have a short
lent, saith Poor Richard, who owe money to be paid at Easter. Then
22. TYLER, supra note 18, at 50-53.
23. Leonard W. Labaree, Benjamin Franklin's British Friendships, 108
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 423, 426 (1964) (quoting Scottish philosopher David
Hume).

2008]

USURY LAW

1119

since, as he says, The borrower is a slave to the lender, and the debtor
to the creditor, disdain the chain, preserve your freedom; and main24
tain your independency: be industrious and free; be frugal and free.

This deep American skepticism of consumer lending encouraged a legal commitment to limited interest rates that continued largely unabated through the end of the nineteenth century. 25 While from time to time states experimented with
eliminating usury laws, these experiments tended to be short
and regarded as failures. 26 Collectively the early American
commitment to interest-rate caps with nominal annual interest
rates in this range created a type of folklore, or even a mythology, of the acceptable pricing in the use of money.
American usury law entered a second phase at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the late 1800s and early
1900s, enforcement problems facilitated the development of a
large group of high-cost lenders charging triple-digit interest
rates of 500% and beyond. 27 While these businesses referred to
themselves as salary lenders, they were popularly known as
loan sharks. 28 Unlike the stereotypical Hollywood-organized
crime imagery (which came much later), turn-of-the-century
loan sharks did not rely on violence or extortion.29 But, they did
charge extremely high prices for loans with short initial dura30
tions that frequently turned into crippling long-term debts.
These companies managed to conduct business profitably using
a variety of legal ruses and questionable practices, including
confessions of judgment, developing mutually profitable rela24. Benjamin Franklin, The Way to Wealth, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY
OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 221, 225-26 (Nina Baym ed., shorter 6th ed. 2003).
25. See TYLER, supra note 18, at 59-60.
26. See id. at 59.
27. See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 15, at 428-29; IRVING S. MICHELMAN,
CONSUMER FINANCE: A CASE HISTORY IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 106-11 (1970).

28. As a historical matter, salary lenders, the nation's first loan sharks,
engaged in essentially the same business model as today's payday lenders.
Payday lenders are loan sharks in the most historically correct sense of that
word. See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL

HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 49-52 (1999); MICHELMAN, supra note 27, at
112-29; LOUIS N. ROBINSON & MAUDE E. STEARNS, TEN THOUSAND SMALL

LOANS: FACTS ABOUT BORROWERS IN 109 CITIES IN 17 STATES 11-13 (1930);
CLARENCE W. WASSAM, SALARY LOAN BUSINESS IN NEW YORK CITY 26 (1908);

Mark H. Haller & John V. Alviti, Loansharkingin American Cities: Historical
Analysis of a MarginalEnterprise, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125, 133-34 (1977);
Peter R. Shergold, The Loan Shark: The Small Loan Business in Early Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh,45 PA. HIST. 195, 195-96 (1978).
29. See Haller & Alviti, supra note 28, at 133-35.
30. See id.
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tionships with magistrate judges, characterizing loans as a sal31
ary assignments, and collections through public humiliation.
Led by an exceptionally energetic social reformer named
Arthur Ham, a consensus eventually emerged on a new direction for the law. 32 Ham argued that the best course for reform

would be to raise the old traditional usury limits to a point
where more mainstream financial institutions could profitably
lend small amounts to working-class borrowers. 33 Working with
the Russell Sage Foundation, a powerful and well-funded charitable organization funded by the widow of an industrial baron, Ham drafted a model law, which most American states
34
eventually adopted in the early part of the twentieth century.
The Russell Sage Foundation's Small Loan Law required
35
consumer lenders to obtain licenses from state governments.
In exchange, states gave these licensed lenders special exceptions to the older usury laws (which generally remained on the
books) authorizing interest rates between 2% and 4% per
month, or, between 24% and 42% per annum. 36 Competition
from mainstream lenders operating under these higher caps,
along with aggressive enforcement by courts and state regulators, managed to stamp out salary lending throughout most of
the mid-twentieth century. 37
While the new, more moderate usury limits contained in
the Russell Sage-inspired Small Loan Laws undoubtedly lega31.

See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost

Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 807, 852-55 (2003) (pointing out lax enforcement of state usury limits
in the gilded age).
32. See CALDER, supra note 28, at 124-35, 143; MICHELMAN, supra note
27, at 112-29.
33. See MICHELMAN, supra note 27, at 116-17.
34. See ROGER S. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS
AND OF USURY, SALES FINANCE, AND ALLIED LAWS, at xiii (1952); CALDER, supra note 28, at 134-35, 143. Many of the states that did not use the Russell
Sage Foundation model law relied on statutes that legalized "Morris Plan"
lending, which facilitated higher real prices by using an add-on interest rate,
rather than traditional simple actuarial interest rates. See EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE CONSUMER 68-72 (1930); FRED H. CLARKSON ET AL., CONSUMER
CREDIT AND ITS USES 32 (Charles 0. Hardy ed., 1938); PETER W. HERZOG, THE
MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL BANKING passim (1928); NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES § 2.2.3.1, at
39 (1995).
35. See BARRETT, supra note 34, app. at 677.
36. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 2.2.3.1, at 38-40,
§ 2.3.3.1, at 48.
37. See id. § 2.5, at 59.
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lized many mutually beneficial transactions, they also diluted
the traditionally sparing American perspective on usury law.
Once states made an exception to the traditional theologically
inspired general usury laws, finding a backstop against further
creditor-encouraged deregulation proved difficult. 38 In the midtwentieth century, each state began to chart its own course,
creating exceptions to the traditional usury laws for a variety of
types of lenders in a variety of ways.3 9 Nevertheless, despite
these changes, through the Vietnam War era every state in the
union retained an interest-rate cap more or less intellectually
indebted to the Ham-era reforms. 40 During all but the last
years of the twentieth century, usury limits were the accepted
norm in American consumer protection law. 4 1
The third, and still current, period in American usury law
began in 1978 with the Supreme Court's decision in Marquette
National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.42 In this landmark case, the Court confronted for the first time the question
of which state usury law applies when a national bank lends
money to a consumer across state lines: should the law of the
bank's home state or the law of the consumer's home state apply? 43 In a historically dubious interpretation of the Civil Warera National Bank Act of 1864, 4 4 the Supreme Court concluded
that the law of the bank's home state applies. 45 This seemingly
innocuous holding was like a gunshot starting a frenzied raceto-the-bottom in American usury law. 46 Recognizing the oppor38.
39.
40.

See id. § 2.2.3.2, at 40.
See Peterson, supra note 31, at 862-63.
See infra Part IV for a discussion surveying usury laws from 1965.

41.

JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

682-83 (3d ed. 2007).
42. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
43. Id. at 309-13.
44. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 108 (1864) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000)).
45. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 439 U.S. at 309-13; see also BRAY HAMMOND,
BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

725-34 (1957) (detailing the events that led to the enactment of the National
Bank Act); NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 3.4.5.1.1, at 74-75
(questioning the historical accuracy of Marquette Nat'7 Bank).
46.

See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 10:29, at 10-47

to -53 (2002); William F. Baxter, Section 85 of the National Bank Act and Consumer Welfare, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1009, 1010-11; Robert C. Eager & C.F.
Muckenfuss, III, Federal Preemption and the Challenge to Maintain Balance
in the Dual Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 66-67 (2004); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2005); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The
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tunity to attract lucrative financial services jobs to their moribund economies, South Dakota and Delaware eliminated their
ancient usury laws, allowing national banks headquartered
there to "export" the nonexistence of an interest-rate cap to
47
consumers in other states.
State-chartered banks were aghast at their national bank
competitors' newfound power and immediately began lobbying
Congress for equal treatment. 48 Two years later Congress complied. But instead of explicitly preempting usury limits, Congress finessed the issue by granting state banks whatever power that was already held by national banks. 49 State
legislatures, who were now powerless to constrain the interest
rates charged by any bank headquartered in South Dakota or
Delaware, capitulated. 50 Seeing no point in punishing local
businesses, every other state in the union passed "parity laws"
granting their own local banks the right to charge whatever interest rate South Dakota and Delaware banks could import into
their jurisdictions via federal law. 51 The end result was what
James White called a trompe Ibleil-a grand illusion. 52 Every
state in the union, save two, had relatively aggressive usury
law on the books. And yet, even though no legislature had ever
passed a law saying as much, the newly synthesized usury rule
became: any bank can charge any interest rate it wants anywhere it wants.

Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding ExportationDoctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 619-20 (2004).
47. James J. White, The Usury Trompe l'Oleil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 44748, 464-65 (2000); see also Schiltz, supra note 46, at 618-20 (referencing Professor James White).

48. Howard J. Finkelstein, Most Favored Lender Status for Insured
Banks, 42 Bus. LAW. 915, 918 (1987).

49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(g), 1831a(b), 1831d(a) (2000); see also Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Notice of General Counsel's Opinion No. 10, 63 Fed.
Reg. 19,258 (Apr. 17, 1998) (interpreting section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as providing state-chartered, federally insured banks the same
interest rate exporting powers as those granted to national banks under section 85 of the National Bank Act).
50. NAT'L CONSUMER LAw CTR., supra note 34, § 3.4.5.1.1, at 74-75 (discussing the effect of "sister-state" preemption).
51. Christian Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National BanksThe Renascence of State Banking Powers, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 368 (1995);
John J. Schroeder, "Duel"Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical
Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197, 207 (2003).
52. See White, supra note 47, at 445-48.
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B. QUICK CASH: PAYDAY LENDING AND ITS CRITICS

While Marquette and its progeny deregulated interest rates
banks could charge, they did not necessarily do so for
nondepository financial institutions. State usury laws, where
they remained on the books, continued to constrain ordinary
businesses. Thus, the personal finance companies licensed under state small-loan laws still had to comply with those interest
rate caps. 53 Yet, in the 1980s the moral authority of those rules
became somewhat suspect. Why should banks be allowed to
charge any interest rate while other businesses could not? This,
along with relatively high prevailing market interest rates
brought about by rampant inflation, gave critics of the usury
laws that remained in force ample ammunition to continue battering state usury laws.5 4 Emboldened by this new regulatory

environment, salary-assignment loan sharks, now using the
more colloquial appellation of "payday lender," reappeared. 5
Since the Federal Trade Commission declared loans in the form
of a salary assignment illegal, payday lenders required a slight
variation in contractual formalities.5 6 Post-dating personal
checks for the anticipated duration of a loan was a convenient
substitute.
A contemporary payday loan usually involves an initial
57
balance of between $100 and $500, with $325 being typical.
Generally the consumer borrows by writing a personal check to
the lender for the loan amount plus an additional fee.5 8 While
there is no agreed upon source of information for payday loans,
the Center for Responsible Lending estimates a typical charge
of $52 for a $325 loan.5 9 The borrower "post-dates" the check by
writing the due date of the loan one or two weeks in the future,
rather than the day on which the consumer actually writes the
NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 2.3.1.3.1, at 43.
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 41, at 685.
55. JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWN.
SHOPS, AND THE POOR 30-35 (1994).
53.

See

54.

56. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(3) (2007).
57. URIAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FINANCIAL
QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION
IN PREDATORY FEES
EVERY YEAR
8,
18-19
(2006),
http://www

.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr012-FinancialQuicksand-1 106.pdf.
58. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 861-62.
59. KING ET AL., supra note 57, at 8. Many lenders, especially Internet
payday lenders, now obtain consent to debit the borrower's back account with
an ACH transfer, rather than using a check. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note
8, at 868-71.
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check. 60 An initial duration of fourteen days is the industry
norm. 6 1 Payday lenders generally do not obtain the borrower's
credit history from one of three national credit reporting companies, nor do they generally report the borrower's repayment
history later on. 62 Instead, payday lenders verify the debtor's
identity by asking for documents or identification such as a
driver's license, recent pay stubs, bank statements, car registration, or telephone bills. 63 Some lenders may also call the bor-

rowers' employers to verify a source of income. 64 After the paperwork is complete, the debtor walks away with the loan
65
principal in cash or a check drawn on the lender's account.
When the duration of the loan has expired, the lender is repaid
by depositing the borrower's check. 66 If the debtor lacks the
funds to cover the obligation, most lenders will allow her to pay
another $52 fee in exchange for holding the check another two
weeks. 67 If the borrower does nothing, and her check does not
clear, most lenders charge an insufficient funds penalty in addition to assessing another $52 charge every two weeks. 68 Assuming a fourteen-day loan duration, the nominal annual simple interest rate of this prototypical loan is about 417%.69
Critics of payday lending allege that loans with triple-digit
nominal annual interest rates by their nature often develop into inescapable debt traps. Generally speaking, a high-risk debtor lacking $325 of liquid assets on any given day is reasonably
unlikely to have $377 two weeks later. Studies by industry72
sponsored think tanks,7 0 federal regulators, 71 state regulators,
60. Scott Andrew Schaaf, Note, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of
the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 341-42 (2001).
61.

KING ETAL., supra note 57, at 3.

62. See Brooks, supra note 7, at 1007.
63. Johnson, supra note 4, at 9.
64. Christopher Lewis Peterson, Only Until Payday: A Primer on Utah's
Growing Deferred Deposit Loan Industry, 15 UTAH B.J. 16, 16 (2002).
65. Johnson, supra note 4, at 10-11.
66. Id.
67.
68.

Id.

70.

See, e.g., GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, GEORGE-

Id.; KING ET AL., supra note 57, at 3-4.
69. This rate does not include the insufficient funds fee. In order to calculate interest rates using the Annual Percentage Rate Calculation Program for
Windows (APRWIN), visit http://www.occ.treas.gov/aprwin.htm.
TOWN UNIV. MCDONOUGH SCH. OF Bus. CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 38 (2001),

http://www.cfsa.net/downloads/analysis customer demand.pdf (stating that
about 35% of borrowers rolled over between one and four times in the preced-
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private contractors hired by state governments, 73 consumer advocacy organizations,7 4 and academics 75 universally agree that
ing year, about 9% of borrowers renewed existing loans nine times or more,
and about 10% of borrowers renewed fourteen times or more).
71. See, e.g., Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending. Do
the Costs Justify the Price? 16-18 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.govlbank/analytical/cfr/
2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_FlannerySamolyk.pdf (determining that high
frequency borrowers are more profitable because they generate lower loss ratios and lower operating costs); COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMIN. OF
NAT'L BANKS, FACT SHEET: EAGLE NATIONAL BANK CONSENT ORDER 2 (2002),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/eaglenbfact%20sheet.pdf (describing payday
loan employee compensation incentives for promoting repeat borrowing).
72. See, e.g., N.C. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON PAYDAY LENDING (n.d.) (stating that 14.06% of customers
used payday lending as a source of credit nineteen or more times at the same
company during the year); LAURA E. UDIS, REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE REVISION COMMITTEE AND ACTIONS OF THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON CONSUMER CREDIT 23 (1999) (on file with author) (estimating that
half of licensed payday lenders authorized to refinance loans do so); Chessin,
supra note 4, at 400-02 (discussing official Colorado payday loan statistics);
ILL. DEP'T. OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT TERM LENDING: FINAL REPORT 26 (1999),
http://www.idfpr.com/dflccd/pdfs/shorterm.pdf (determining that the average
payday loan customer earns $24,000 per year and remains indebted for at
least six months); IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., SUMMARY OF PAYDAY LENDER
EXAMINATION 3 (1999), http://www.in.gov/dfilegal/paydaylend/Payday.PDF
(finding that only 9% of customers had not renewed, and that customers averaged ten renewals of their payday loans); WASH. STATE DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS.,
PAYDAY LENDING REPORT 3 (2003), http://dfi.wa.gov/news/DFI_paydayreport
.pdf (determining that over 30% of borrowers borrow more than ten times per
year, and almost 10% borrow twenty times or more per year).
73. See, e.g., VERITEC SOLUTIONS, FLORIDA TRENDS IN DEFERRED PRESENTMENT: STATE OF FLORIDA DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROGRAM 12 (2005),
http://www.veritecs.com/FL trendssep_2005.pdf (stating that the average
Florida customer borrows 7.9 times per year, and 26.5% of customers borrow
12 or more times per year, which accounts for 57.7% of all transactions); VERITEC SOLUTIONS, OKLAHOMA TRENDS IN DEFERRED DEPOSIT LENDING: OKLAHOMA DEFERRED DEPOSIT PROGRAM 8 (2005), http://www.veritcs.conOK_
trends 11_2005.pdf (finding that the average Oklahoma customer borrows 9.4
times per year and 26.8% of customers borrow 13 times or more per year,
which accounts for 61.7% of all transactions).
74. See, e.g., OR. STUDENT PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, PREYING
ON PORTLANDERS: PAYDAY LENDING IN THE CITY OF PORTLAND 4 (2005),
http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/WX/q1/WXqlaunM3sfFqK6Taixxiw/
preyingonportlanders.pdf (finding that 74% of payday loan borrowers are unable to pay their loan when it comes due); U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH
GROUP, SHOW ME THE MONEY: A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF
PAYDAY LENDER LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 8 (2000), http://www
.uspirg.org/uploads/OJ/JI/OJJIxjolTQlIpsOOhaP dg/showmethemoneyfinal
.PDF [hereinafter SHOW ME THE MONEY] (stating that payday loans are designed to keep consumers in perpetual debt).
75. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 4, at 55-72 (discussing the pervasive
practice of "rollover" lending and the failure of state laws to adequately ad-
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payday borrowers tend to fall into recurring debt patterns.
Payday loans are not short-term debts. Because payday loans
carry such high prices, and because payday lenders do not use
underwriting guidelines to determine borrowers' ability to repay, payday loans typically compound for durations far beyond
the initial one or two week due date. Looking past the boilerplate terms written on loan contracts, it is economically more
accurate to think of payday loans as medium-term debts with
modest prepayment rates.
Critics of payday lending also allege that those most likely
to be caught in debt traps are members of vulnerable groups
who can least afford triple-digit interest rate pricing. Empirical
evidence suggests that in some areas black families are more
76
likely than white families to take out multiple payday loans.
Payday lenders disproportionately set up locations in poor and
minority neighborhoods. 77 And, payday lenders systematically
cluster around military bases with large populations of enlisted
78
personnel.
Despite targeting a clientele of limited means, payday
lending has proven wildly profitable. The evidence suggests
that payday lending profits come disproportionately from re-

dress the practice); Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A
Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 19

(2003) (discussing the "rollover" lending practice and the effect it has on the
customer).

76. See Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Welfare, Work and Banking:
The Use of Consumer Credit by Current and Form TANF Recipients in Charlotte, North Carolina, 27 J. URB. AFF. 379, 387-88 (2005) ("African American

households are eight times more likely to borrow from a payday lender as
whites .. "); see also MICHAEL A. STEGMAN & ROBERT FARIS, THE CTR. FOR
CMTY. CAPITALISM AT THE UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, WELFARE, WORK,

AND BANKING: THE NORTH CAROLINA FINANCIAL SERVICES SURVEY 2 (2001),

http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/CC-welfare.pdf (finding that African Americans and Hispanics are half as likely as whites to own bank accounts).
77. See ANTHONY KOLB, REPORT ON: SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF BANK AND
CHECK-CASHING LOCATIONS IN CHARLOTTE, NC 14, 27 (1999) (on file with au-

thor) (finding that there are four times as many check cashing offices in Charlotte neighborhoods with 10% or greater minority populations than in neighborhoods with 10% or less minorities); Steven M. Graves, Landscapes of
Predation,Landscapes of Neglect: A Location Analysis of Payday Lenders and
Banks, 55 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 303, 312-13 (2003) (reporting that payday

lenders are disproportionately located in poor and nonwhite Illinois and Louisiana communities).
78. Graves & Peterson, supra note 6, at 822 (reporting that in twelve of
the nineteen surveyed states, the highest per capita concentration of payday

lenders was in a military county).
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peat borrowers. 79 By one estimate, approximately 90% of payday lending revenues are based on fees stripped from trapped
borrowers.80 After only a few extensions of the original loan
principal, a borrower can find that she has repaid more than
the original balance but still owes the same principal.8 1 The
best available nationwide estimate suggests that the average
payday loan borrower repays $793 for a $325 loan.8 2 Industry

observers estimate that, even after charge-offs, most payday
lenders earn a return on assets between ten and twenty times
greater than traditional banks.8 3 Responding to these returns,
capital has flooded into the payday lending industry, transforming financial services offered to lower- and middle-class
borrowers in little more than a decade. In the early 1990s, payday lending was a small peripheral component of the financial
services industry with only a few hundred locations nation-5
8
wide. 8 4 Today, payday lending is no longer a "fringe" business.
Between 2000 and 2004 alone, the number of payday lender locations more than doubled from 10,000 to 22,000.86 Investment

analysts predict that absent government intervention, this
number will nearly double again, growing to upwards of 40,000
by 2011.87
79. PETER SKILLERN, CMTY. REINVESTMENT ASS'N. OF N.C., SMALL LOANS,
BIG BUCKS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PAYDAY LENDING INDUSTRY IN NORTH CAROLINA 4 (2002) (on file with author) (finding that 3% of customers who borrow

twenty-five times or more per year generate 10% of industry revenue, while
16% of customers who borrow once per year generate less than 2% of revenue
and borrowers using payday loans five times or more per year account for 85%
of total transactions).
80. KING ETAL., supra note 57, at 2, 6.
81. See Michael A. Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of Payday
Lending, 66 POPULAR GOV'T. 16, 19-20 (2001).
82. KING ET AL., supra note 57, at 8.
83. Michael Hudson, Going for Broke: How the 'Fringe Banking' Boom
Cashes in on the Poor, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Cl; see also SHOW ME
THE MONEY, supra note 74, at 8 ("The Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions reported to its legislature that licensed payday lenders earned over
30% return on investment in the first nine months of legal operation.").
84. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, An Update on Emerging Issues in Banking: Payday Lending (Jan. 29, 2003), http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analyticalfyi2003/012903fyi.html ("Industry analysts estimate that the
number of payday loan offices nationwide increased from less than 500 in the
early 1990's to approximately 12,000 in 2002, with continued growth expected.").
85. Cf. CASKEY, supra note 55, at 30-35 (providing an early analysis of
the resurgence in salary lending).
86. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 71, at 2.
87. DENNIS TELZROW & DAVID BURTZLAFF, STEPHENS, INC. INV. BANKERS,
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A background discussion of the current state of usury law
and payday lending demands one additional point. In late 2006,
Congress for the first time broke its long silence on the propriety of consumer credit pricing, albeit for a special subset of the
population. Recognizing the troubling implications of payday
lenders clustering around military installations, Congress
adopted a 36% interest-rate cap on loans to all military personnel and their dependents.8 8 In hearings preceding passage of
the statute Congress pointed to research identifying this pattern.8 9 It remains to be seen whether the new congressional
usury law for military service members will be the first step returning to more traditional credit-pricing limits for all Americans.
II. METHODOLOGY: THE ANATOMY OF A PRICE CAP
This study is unique in that no research has yet systematically measured state usury laws by translating them into a single uniform terminology. Because states have written their
usury laws with a hodgepodge of different accounting methods
and legal terminology, 90 policy makers, the press, and the public cannot easily compare the extent to which different states
have actually provided meaningful consumer protection to their
residents. This study explores whether these different methods
create significant variations in prices that can be more accurately revealed by using one actuarially sound pricing terminology. This is possible because while there is no accepted method for capping loan prices, there is a uniform national
method of comparing loan prices. Indeed, the federal TILA was
PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY ANNUAL INDUSTRY UPDATE 9 (2006) (on file with au-

thor).
88. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (to be codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b)) ("A creditor... may not impose an annual percentage
rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit
extended to a covered member or a dependent of a covered member.").
89. See A Review of the Department of Defense's Report on PredatoryLending PracticesDirected at Members of the Armed Forces and Their Dependents:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th
Cong. (2006) (written testimony of Christopher Peterson, Associate Professor,
University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin College of Law), available at http://
banking.senate.gov/_files/ACF7541.pdf (discussing predatory lenders clustering around military bases); FinancialService Needs of Military Personnel and
Their Families: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement of
Rep. Maxine Waters).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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designed to do exactly this: provide an accurate way to compare
loans. 9 1 Section A of this Part explains how the TILA's federal
price comparison rules can be used to compare and contrast the
most expensive payday loans allowed in each state. Moreover,
Section B suggests a new way of measuring the extent to which
states deviate from the TILA's descriptive conventions in their
usury statutes.
A. MEASURING USURY LIMITS: A NEW APPLICATION OF THE
TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
This Article measures usury law by calculating the most
expensive typical payday loan permissible in each state. Currently the best available evidence estimates that the prototypical American payday loan involves a cash advance of $325 for
fourteen days. 92 Assuming a hypothetical loan with these two
characteristics, one can calculate a maximum dollar amount
that a lender may legally charge in any given state. 93 The price
of each state's most expensive permissible loan is then expressed using the uniform credit-pricing terminology created by
the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA).
In 1968, Congress adopted the TILA, 94 a disclosure statute,
in hopes of providing a more efficient way for consumers to
compare the cost of credit. 95 Under the TILA, there are four key
components in the pricing of a payday loan: the amount financed, the finance charge, the total of payments, and an an-

91. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 4.4.1, at 121-22.
92. KING ET AL., supra note 57, at 3, 18-19. Unfortunately, there are no
publicly available statistics estimating a national mean payday loan principal
or initial duration. The King et al. study comes as close as possible by compiling information from industry sources as well as information from nineteen
different state regulators. See id. at 18 (estimating the average payday loan
amount).
93. Many states allow different types of lenders to charge different prices
based on what type of loan is offered and whether the necessary licensing requirements have been met. In selecting which price-rate cap to measure, this
study analyzed each potential cap in each statute and selected the cap that
would allow the highest price for the hypothetical loan. This study presumed
that any necessary licensing requirements were satisfied.
94. Truth-in-Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (2000)).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) ("It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him .... "); see also
Peterson, supra note 31, at 875-902 (discussing the TILA's legislative history,
purpose, and efficacy).
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nual percentage rate. 96 An amount financed is roughly equivalent to the principal of the loan-"the amount of credit of which
the consumer has actual use."97 A finance charge includes all
charges incident to the extension of credit expressed as a dollar
amount. 98 Roughly speaking, the finance charge is the price of a
loan. 99 Importantly, as defined under federal law, the finance
charge includes not only interest paid on the loan, but also
most fees and closing costs. 100 The term "total of payments" refers to the total amount of money a borrower must repay under
the loan contract. 10 1 Accordingly, in a payday loan the total of
payments is generally equivalent to the amount financed plus
the finance charge. 102 Finally, the annual percentage rate, or
"APR" as it is commonly abbreviated, is an actuarially sound
measure of the cost of credit expressed as a yearly rate that relates to the amount and timing of value received by the consumer to the amount and timing of payments made. 0 3 Although the annual percentage rate is expressed as a rate, it is
not an interest rate. 104 Rather, it is simply an annualized ex96. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1606, 1638.
97. Id. § 1638(a)(2)(A); see also PRIDGEN, supra note 46, § 6:10, at 6-29 to
-30 (discussing the requirement to disclose the amount financed); RALPH J.
RHONER & FRED. H. MILLER, TRUTH-IN-LENDING
5.05[2], at 294-97 (Robin
A. Cook et al. eds., 2000 & Supp. 2003) (describing the computation of and required disclosure within statutorily defined "amount financed").
98. For definitions of "finance charge," see 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) and 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2007).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a).
100. See 12 C.F.R § 226.4(a)-(b), for a definition of which fees are included
within the finance charge disclosure. Late fees and other contingent charges
are not included within the definition of a finance charge. Id. § 226.4(c)(2).
Congress and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors have come under criticism for making exceptions for some fees, particularly with respect to real estate loans. For example, in a home mortgage, money paid by the consumer to
the lender to acquire a credit report is counterintuitively not considered a
charge incident to the extension of credit. Id. § 226.4(c)(7)(iii). Most of the
more controversial exceptions, however, are not relevant to this study.
101. In installment loans, the total of payments is equivalent to the sum of
all scheduled payments. RHONER & MILLER, supra note 97,
5.05[8], at 31920.
102. The total of payments disclosure is optional in single payment loans.
12 C.F.R. § 226.18(h) & n.44. Prepaid finance charges need not be included in
the total of payments. RHONER & MILLER, supra note 97, 5.05[8], at 319-20.
In most payday loans no prepaid finance charges are involved. Accordingly,
the total of payments in a payday loan will generally be the sum of the finance
charge and the amount financed.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (defining annual percentage rate).
104. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 4.4.1, at 121-22 (distinguishing annual percentage rates from interest rates).
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pression of the ratio between the finance charge and the
amount financed. 105
Comparing loans with an annual percentage rate is much
more accurate than attempting to make comparisons with the
ambiguous notion of an interest rate. Although it is common to
speak casually about credit in terms of an interest rate, this
concept is surprisingly ambiguous and subject to manipulation.10 6 An interest rate is subject to manipulation because of
the different time periods for which it can be quoted, the various modes of calculation, and the associated fees. Interest rates
can be quoted in terms of a daily, monthly, annual, or any other
nominal time period. 10 7 Interest rates can be calculated as simple or effective rates. 0 8 Nominal interest rates can be calculated as simple rates, as add-on rates, or discount rates-all of
which generate widely varying prices for loans. 109 Moreover,
unlike an annual percentage rate, none of these concepts capture the added price of ancillary fees or closing costs associated
with a loan. 110 Unless one clarifies and understands the math
and accounting behind all of these terms, the concept of an "interest rate" is essentially meaningless and prone to great mischief. In contrast, federal law defines and prescribes the annual percentage rate."' Quoting an annual percentage rate is
generally more reliable because the concept is based on an actuarially sound methodology that generates a uniform standardized "yardstick" by which to compare all types of loans.1 1 2
This study examines loan-price limits in two time periods:
the law in force in 1965 and current law. The study uses midtwentieth century usury laws to provide a basis of comparison
to current law to illustrate how usury law has changed in recent generations. The year 1965 was chosen in particular because it provides a good snapshot of traditional usury laws in
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(1)(A); PRIDGEN, supra note 46, § 6:9, at 6-24 to
-29.
106. See Peterson, supra note 31, at 853.
107. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 4.3, at 99 (stating
that there is a periodicity to interest calculations).
108. Simple interest accrues on money borrowed but not previously accrued
interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 830 (8th ed. 2004). An effective, or compound interest rate includes interest both on the money borrowed as well as
previously accrued interest. Id. at 830-31.
109. These terms are discussed further infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1606(a).
111. Id.
112. PRIDGEN, supra note 46, § 6:9, at 6-24 to -29.
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force throughout most of the twentieth century. By the mid1960s the Russell Sage Foundation's influential model smallloan law was in its fully mature seventh draft. 113 By 1959, all
fifty states had been admitted to the Union. 114 The financial
hardship and trauma associated with the Great Depression and
World War II were receding," 5 and America's "greatest generation"1 16 had assumed control of the government. The year 1965
also predates passage of the Consumer Credit Protection Act in
1968, which complicated consumer law by shifting the focus of
11 7
policymaking away from contract restrictions to disclosure.
Finally, the American Bar Association published Barbara Curran's treatise on consumer credit pricing in 1965, creating a
useful historical record and cogent legal classification of usury
118
limits upon which this study extensively relies.
To compare current usury laws to those in effect in 1965,
the current typical payday loan size of $325 was adjusted for
inflation to its relative value in the earlier time period. Legislation adopted in 1965 likely would have governed loans made in
the subsequent year. This study, therefore, converted the value
of 2006 dollars (the most recent year with conversion factors
available at the inception of this project) into the value of 1966
dollars using the Consumer Price Index's conversion factor of
0.161.119 Accordingly, this study estimates that a typical contemporary loan of $325 would have had a value of approximately $52.33 in loans governed by 1965 usury law.
In 1965, states limited prices on a two-week loan of $52.33
in one of four basic ways. First, thirty-five states articulated
their price limit with a simple monthly or annual nominal in-

113. See George G. Bogert, The Future of Small Loan Legislation, 12 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1944) (noting that the seventh draft was formed in 1942 and
was influential in small loan laws).
114. See An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the
Union, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959) (admitting the fiftieth state, Hawaii,
to the Union).
115. See Christina D. Romer, What Ended the Great Depression?, 52 J.
ECON. HIST. 757, 757-61 (1992) (discussing the economic factors that brought
the United States out of the Great Depression).
116.

TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION 3-12 (2004).

117. Peterson, supra note 31, at 880.
118. BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION
158-66 (1965).
119. Robert C. Sahr, Inflation Conversion Factors for Dollars 1665 to Estimated 2017 (Jan. 18, 2007), http://oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/faculty-researcbl
sahr/sahr.htm.
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terest-rate cap. 120 Second, seven states capped prices with an
"add-on" interest-rate cap.121 Third, another seven states used
a
"discount" interest-rate cap. 122 And finally, one state used a fee
schedule listing a specific dollar amount that lenders could
charge for a loan of the size studied. 123 For each state, standard
accounting rules were followed to generate the largest permissible finance charge for an inflation-adjusted typical fourteen-

120. CURRAN, supra note 118, at 158-66. Simple interest rates are also referred to as actuarial interest rates. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note
34, § 3.1.1, at 61-63. Calculation of a simple interest rate is a matter of multiplying the principal by the interest rate by the term of the loan. Id. § 4.2, at

98-99.
121. CURRAN, supra note 118, at 158-66. In an add-on interest rate, the
lender precomputes interest at the outset of the loan for the full term of the
loan as if the principal did not decline over the course of the loan. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 4.3.2, at 106-08. This distinction is important in installment loans since the amount of money actually available to the
borrower declines as the consumer makes each payment. Thus, in an installment loan, an add-on interest rate significantly understates the actual price of
the loan in comparison to a simple interest rate. Id. For purposes of this study
the distinction between add-on and simple interest rates does not come into
play because the hypothetical loan in question is a single payment loan.
122. CURRAN, supra note 118, at 158-66. Similar to an add-on interest
rate, lenders that use a discount interest rate precompute the interest at the
outset of the loan for the full duration of the loan. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
supra note 34, § 4.3.3, at 108-09. But, with discount interest, the lender subtracts or discounts the interest from the "face amount" of the loan. Id. The National Consumer Law Center's Cost of Credit: Regulation and Legal Challenges treatise provides a helpful example: in a one-year loan of $1000 at an
8% discount interest rate, the precomputed interest will be $80. Id. If this interest is discounted, then the borrower walks away from origination with $920
in actual principal. Id. In installment loans, discount interest rates understate
actual credit prices in comparison both to simple interest rates and add-on interest rates. Id.
123. CURRAN, supra note 118, at 161. This state was Mississippi. Id. Mississippi's small-loan law included a schedule of maximum monthly charges for
loans of $99 or less. Id. For loans between $51 and $60, interest and service
charges could not exceed $2.06 per month. Early v. Williams, 123 So. 2d 446,
448 (Miss. 1960). Unfortunately, the statute does not specifically address how
to calculate maximum permissible charges for loans with durations less than
one month. Making an educated guess, this study calculated a maximum permissible charge for the hypothetical fourteen-day loan by multiplying the
monthly limit by twelve in order to extrapolate an annual maximum charge of
$24.72. This represents an actuarial annual nominal interest rate of
47.23867%. Using this rate we found a maximum charge for our fourteen-day
loan of $0.9481642, which rounded to $0.95. Mississippi's strategy for capping
prices is probably rare because, unlike interest-rate caps, it does not naturally
adjust with inflation. In this regulatory environment the usury limit actually
declines over time.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1134

[92:1110

day payday loan. 124 When a statute authorized an ancillary fee

in addition to interest, this fee was included in the finance
charge if current federal law would require disclosure of that
125

fee as part of the finance charge under TILA regulations.
Next, the study used the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's publicly available annual percentage rate calculation
software, APRWIN v.6, to determine the maximum permissible
annual percentage rate for our hypothetical loan in each
26
state. 1
Where price limits in 1965 were generally expressed in
terms of an interest rate, many states now limit prices in relation to the size of a loan rather than the speed with which it
grows over time. 12 7 Accordingly, measuring current price caps
required adjusting methodology to account for two newer methods used by state legislatures. First, some states now impose
price limits on payday loans relative to the amount of money
borrowed by the consumer in any given transaction. For example, Kansas currently caps payday loan prices at 15% of the
amount borrowed. 128 In a payday loan of typical size and duration, this limits the lender's finance charge to $48.75. This Article classifies price limits of this type as amount-financed caps.
Second, some states impose price limits relative to the amount
which the consumer must repay upon completion of the loan
contract. For example, Arizona caps loan prices at 15% of the
124. See infra app. tbl.6. Where the usury law used a monthly nominal interest rate, a maximum annual percentage rate on our hypothetical fourteenday loan was calculated by first converting the monthly nominal interest rate
into an annual nominal interest rate by multiplying the monthly rate by
twelve, the number of months in a year. Next, a finance charge was calculated
based on the maximum annual nominal interest rate extrapolated from the
monthly limits. Thus, for Alaska's 1965 price limit, which allowed a finance
charge of 4% per month on the first $300 of credit, we assumed twelve equal
periods producing an annual nominal interest rate of 48%. CURRAN, supra
note 118, at 158. A finance charge based on this cap was obtained by taking,
where p is principal, r is the annual nominal interest rate, and t is the loan
term in days. This generates a finance charge of
52.33- 0.48.14
-

= 0.96
365
125. Thus, a "service fee" would be included in the finance charge, but a
late payment fee would not. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (2007).
126. In order to access the Annual Percentage Rate Calculation Program
for Windows (APRWIN), visit http://www.occ.treas.gov/aprwin.htm.
127. Compare infra app. tbl.5, with infra app. tbl.6.
128. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-404 (1)(c) (Supp. 2006) ("[A] licensed or supervised lender may charge an amount not to exceed 15% of the amount of the
cash advance.").
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amount a consumer is scheduled to repay at the terminal date
of the loan. 129 So, for a typical payday loan in Arizona, a lender
can legally charge up to $57.35. This Article classifies price limits of this type as total of payment caps. For states with both
amount-financed caps or total-of-payment caps this study calculated the highest dollar amount, rounded to the nearest cent,
permitted for a typical payday loan. This dollar amount was
next converted into an annual percentage rate using APRWIN
v.6 software. The resulting annual percentage rates provide
comparable characterizations of each state's usury limit on a
typical payday loan. 130

129. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1260(F) (2000 & Supp. 2007) ("A licensee
shall not directly or indirectly charge any fee or other consideration for accepting a check for deferred presentment or deposit that is more than fifteen per
cent of the face amount of the check for any initial transaction or any extension.").
130. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-18A-12 (Supp. 2007); ALASKA STAT.
§ 06.50.460 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1260(F); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 2352-104(b) (Supp. 2007); CAL. FIN. CODE § 23036 (West Supp. 2008); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-105 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-563 (2004); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2227-2238, 2744 (2001 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. § 560.405
(Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-3-14 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480F-4(c)
(Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-42-201(1), 28-46-401 to -413 (2005 &
Supp. 2007); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(e) (2007); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7201(1), (2) (Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE § 533D.9(1) (Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 16a-2-404; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.9-100(2) (West Supp. 2007); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3578.4(A) (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 2-401(2),
(7)(C) (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-306(a)(2)(i) (LexisNexis
2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 140, § 100 (Supp. 2007); 209 MASS. CODE REGS.
26.01 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2153 (Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT.
§ 47.60, subdiv. 2 (Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-519(4) (Supp. 2007);
Mo. REV. STAT §§ 408.505(3), 408.100 (Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1722 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-918 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 604A.010-.940 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:12(1) (2006); N.J.
STAT. ANN § 2C:21-19 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); N.M. STAT. § 58-15-33 (Supp.
2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-173
(2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12 (2004 & Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1315.39, 1315.40 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 3108(A)
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 725.622 (2007); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6213 (West
2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-14.4-4 (Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-39-180(E)
(Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-3-1.1, 54-4-65 (Supp. 2007); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(b) (Supp. 2006); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.252 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-1, 70C-2-101 (Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 41a (Supp. 2007); VA. CODE. ANN. § 6.1-460 (Supp. 2007); WASH. REV.
CODE § 31.45.073(3) (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-4-107 (LexisNexis Supp.
2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.04, 138.05 (West Supp. 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-14-363 (2007).
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B. MEASURING PERCEPTION OF USURY LIMITS: SALIENCE
DISTORTION
In addition to measuring permissible annual percentage
rates under state usury laws, this Article also creates a new
method of measuring how much a usury statute underemphasizes or overemphasizes the price of a loan in comparison to
federal disclosure law. The central concept in this new method
of analyzing usury laws is referred to as the salience distortion
associated with a price cap. Salience distortion is defined as the
absolute value of the difference between the annual percentage
rate of a usury statute's most expensive permissible loan and
the most prominent, or salient, number written in the statutory
language limiting the price of the loan.
The notion of salience as it is used here merits some further explanation. Because currency is numerical, in any statute
that caps the price of a loan, the legislature must at some point
pick a number or numbers. 131 While this is true of every usury
law, the specific number a legislature chooses only has meaning
in relation to other variables associated with the law in question. For example, one legislature might adopt a usury limit of
8% per year while another might adopt a cap of 8% per month.
Both legislatures would have chosen to feature the same number in the language of the statute, but the latter cap is twelve
times higher than the former because there are twelve months
per year. Theoretically, if it wanted to do so, a legislature could
instead adopt an interest-rate cap of 8% per century-which
would create a price cap much, much lower than either the
monthly or annual cap. Or a legislature could adopt a cap of 8%
per second, which would generate an extremely high price limit. Of course no state has chosen to do either because centuries
and seconds are not convenient temporal units of measurement
in the context of loans. The point here is simply that if it chooses to do so, a legislature can pick a small number and create a
relatively high price limit. Or, it can pick a large number and
create a relatively low price limit. Legislatures can feature
whatever number they want in a usury law. The concept of salience in this study merely gives weight to the legislatures' linguistic choice, irrespective of the actual price generated.
To this end, several guidelines were used in ascribing the
most salient number to each statute. 132 If the state's price limit
131.

See infra tbl.4.

132.

Some states use tiered caps based on different loan amounts. For ex-
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was expressed with an interest-rate cap, that interest rate is
presumed to be the most salient number in the statute. This
statement holds irrespective of the nominal time limit referred
to in the statute. For example, in an interest-rate cap of 3% per
month, the most salient number is presumed to be 3. Yet, if the
statute has an interest-rate cap of 36% per year, the most salient number is 36, even though the actual price allowed is the
same as the 3% monthly cap. Similarly, in keeping with the ancient convention of describing credit with interest rates, even
where a law authorized ancillary fees (such as a service fee),
the interest rate is nevertheless presumed to be the more salient number. 133 Moreover, in states where the price limit was
expressed with a fraction, the numerator divided by the denominator is presumed to be the most salient number in the statute. For example, Connecticut limits loan prices to $17 per
$100 per year, or 17%.134 So, the most salient number in the
Connecticut usury law is presumed to be 17.135 The same concepts hold in states using amount-financed caps and total-of36
payment caps.1

The notion of salience distortion builds on the assignment
of a salient number to each statute by contrasting it to the
maximum annual percentage rate permitted by the statute for
a given loan. Thus, a statute's salience distortion was generatample, New Hampshire's 1965 statute capped prices at a limit of $16 per year
per $100 loaned on the first $600 of principal, then $12 per $100 on principal
in excess of $600. CURRAN, supra note 118, at 162. The most salient number is
the percentage rate applicable to the amount financed because this study focuses on a typical payday loan. Thus, the number 16, as New Hampshire's
most salient number in 1965. In states where the two pricing tiers were applied to the loan, the study selected the percentage rate applicable to the preponderant amount of principal lent.
133. Lawmakers and creditors have used interest rates as the central component of credit pricing and usury limits since the first recorded civilizations.
See CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR
THE HIGH COST CREDIT MARKET 45-75 (2004) (discussing ancient usury laws
and loan terms); see also HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 15, passim (cataloguing
prevailing interest rates in major human civilizations).
134. CURRAN, supra note 118, at 159.
135. Like Connecticut, virtually all states that express their price limits
with a fraction use the number 100 in the denominator, in effect translating a
dollar amount into a percentage. One exception was North Carolina's 1965
usury limit, which limited loan prices to $1 per $5 per year. Id. at 163. This is
simply another way of imposing a 20% annual interest rate cap. Dividing 1 by
5, the most salient number in this statute is presumed to be 20.
136. Thus, the most salient number in Kansas's current cap of 15% of the
amount advanced to a consumer is 15. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-404 (1995 &
Supp.2006).
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ed by subtracting the statute's most salient number from its
maximum permissible annual percentage rate. The greater the
difference between the most salient number and the annual
percentage rate, the higher the salience distortion. For example, current Virginia law states that payday lenders may
charge "an amount not to exceed fifteen percent of the amount
of the loan proceeds advanced to the borrower."'137 Fifteen percent of a $325 loan is $48.75. A finance charge of this amount
in a loan with an intended duration of fourteen days would carry an annual percentage rate of about 391%. Given these facts,
this study assigns the current Virginia statute a salience distortion score of 376. Like Virginia, any statute with a low salient number and a high maximum annual percentage rate
would have a large salience distortion. Conversely, a statute
with a salient number that happens to be the same as the maximum annual percentage rate would have a salience distortion
of zero. The innovation of a salience distortion variable is that
it creates quantifiable measurement of the extent to which the
number featured in a usury law underemphasizes or overemphasizes the uniform national descriptive standard in credit
price comparison.
III. FINDINGS: THE ATTRITION OF AMERICAN USURY
LAW
Applying these methodologies to state usury laws leads to
three empirical findings: (1) usury law has become more lax, (2)
usury law has become more polarized, and (3) usury law has
become more misleading. This Part takes each finding in turn.
A. USURY LAW HAS BECOME MORE LAX
In virtually every measurable way usury law has become
much more lax since 1965. In 1965, every state in the union
had a usury limit on consumer loans. 13 8 Today, seven states
have completely deregulated interest rates within their borders. 139 In 1965, banks were bound to comply with all state
usury laws. Today, banks are free to charge whatever interest
rate they choose within the loose and changing tolerances chosen by banking regulators for their safety and soundness guide137.
138.

VA. CODE. ANN. § 6.1-460 (Supp. 2007).
CURRAN, supra note 118, at 158-66.

139. States with no credit price limit whatsoever include Delaware, Idaho,
Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. See infra app.
tbl.6.
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lines. 140 In 1965, no state had law either explicitly or implicitly
authorizing prices with an annual percentage rate of over
300%.141 Today, at least 35 states have laws allowing lenders to
charge over 300% on a typical payday loan. 142 In 1965, usury
laws were drafted with sufficient rigidity that 45 states held actual allowed annual percentage rates to 60% or under. 143 Today, the number of states accomplishing this has fallen to only
6.144 The state with the highest price cap on payday loans of the
studied size and duration was Missouri. Missouri allows licensed lenders to originate payday loans with interest and fees
amounting to 75% of the initial amount of any single loan.1 4 5 A
$325 loan that grows 75% in 14 days carries an annual percentage rate of 1955.36%. The Appendix following this Article includes a complete list of annual percentage rates on maximum
state usury limits, along with a national rank for each state.
While a strong deregulatory trend existed across the country, not every region abandoned usury law with equal disregard. Figure 1, infra, compares the median maximum permissible annual percentage rate for five regions around the country
in both time periods. The northeastern states have tended to
limit consumer loan pricing most aggressively. 146 In 1965 the
median actual annual percentage rate of the northeastern
states' usury limit on an inflation-adjusted typical payday loan
was 30%. By 2007 this median more than tripled to 94%.147 In

other regions of the country, 1965 usury laws resolved to a median of 36%.148 By 2007 every region outside the Northeast had
a regional median of over 300%. 149 The most laissez faire region
of the country is currently the Mountain West with a regional
median of 521%.150

140. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
141. See infra app. tbl.5.
142. See infra app. tbl.6.
143. The five states allowing more than 60% were Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See infra app. tbl.6.
144. These states are Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and West Virginia. See infra app. tbl.6.
145. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 408.100, 408.505(3) (Supp. 2007).
146. See infra fig.1.
147. See infra fig.1.
148. See infra fig.1.
149. See infra fig.1.
150. See infra fig.1.
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Figure 1. Median APR of State Usury Limits on Typical
Payday Loans by Region: 1965 & 2007
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Taking the Northeast and Mountain West regions as examples, Tables 2 and 3, infra, provide specific state-by-state
usury limit information. In 1965 every northeastern state
capped credit prices. 15 1 Eight of eleven states capped prices at
an annual percentage rate of 36% or below. Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania all had comparable limits on interest
rates. 152 But each of these states also allowed special fees in
addition to interest, which drove their actual prices much higher than their regional counterparts. Maryland, in particular,
153
allowed a one-time fee of $4 at the origination of every loan.
Because of the relatively small principal, $52.33, of an inflation
adjusted typical payday loan, the initial fee drove Maryland's
actual maximum permissible annual percentage rate up to
205%, the fourth highest in the nation at that time. Maryland
later closed this loophole, settling on a much more consumer
protective cap of around 33% annual percentage rate. 154 Maryland's 1965 limit of 205% does not seem out of the ordinary in
comparison to regional 2007 limits. Two northeastern states,
Delaware and New Hampshire, have deregulated completely. 155
Rhode Island has adopted a payday lending authorization statute capping credit prices proportional to the amount of money
financed, resulting in a limit on payday loan prices of around
391%.156 Massachusetts, Maine, and Pennsylvania all have
traditional interest-rate-limiting usury laws but allow relatively high special fees that generate actual annual percentage rate
limits of around 201%, 183%, and 94%, respectively. Connecti-

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See infra tbl.2.
CURRAN, supra note 118, at 159-64.
Id. at 161.
See infra tbl.2.
See infra tbl.2.
See infra tbl.2.
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cut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont have all
retained traditional usury regulation with minimal loopholes or
exceptions.
Table 2. Maximum Annual Percentage Rates of Northeasthern
State Usury Limits on Typical Payday Loans, 1965 & 2007
2007
Maximum
APR (%)

2007 APR
Rank

47

17

50

7

unlimited

1

13

201

39

1965
Maximum
APR (%)

1965 APR
Rank

Connecticut

17

Delaware

58

Maine

36

State

205

4

33

45

Massachusetts

30

34

183

41

New Hampshire

16

48

unlimited

1

New Jersey

30

34

30

47

New York

30

34

25

48

Pennsylvania

60

6

94

43

Rhode Island

36

13

391

26

Vermont

30

34

18

49

Maryland

Like the Northeast, in 1965 every Mountain West state limited the prices of loans with a duration and principal comparable to today's payday loans. These 1965 limits ranged between 20% and 42%, with four states settling on a mode of
36%.157 In 2007, two states, Idaho and Utah, deregulated their
permissible loan prices altogether.158 The remaining states now
have only half-hearted limits on loan prices that range between
New Mexico's recently enacted cap of about 404% to Montana's
cap
lender-friendly 652% legal maximum-the second highest
159
in the nation on a loan of the studied size and length.

157.
158.
159.

See infra tbl.3.
See infra tbl.3.
See infra tbl.3.
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Table 3. Maximum Annual Percentage Rates of Mountain West
State Usury Limits on Typical Payday Loans, 1965 & 2007
1965
Maximum
APR (%)

1965
APR Rank

2007
Maximum
APR (%)

2007
APR Rank

Arizona

36

13

460

16

Colorado

36

13

496

15

Idaho

36

13

unlimited

1

Montana

20

44

652

10

New Mexico

36

13

404

1

Utah

36

13

unlimited

1

Wyoming

42

10

521

13

State

In summary, the 1965 median usury limit on an inflation
adjusted typical payday loan was approximately 36% annual
percentage rate. In 2007 the median national usury limit on a
typical payday loan has grown ten times over to an astonishing
annual percentage rate of 391%.160 It is perhaps not a coincidence that the recent Pentagon-backed legislation reestablishing a traditional usury limit for loans to military personnel
caps prices at an annual percentage rate of 36%-the 1965 national median. 161
B. USURY LAW HAS BECOME MORE POLARIZED
By every measure of spread, the state limits on consumer
loan pricing became more polarized between 1965 and 2007.
Driven by Missouri's outlying price cap, the range of all state
usury limits on typical payday loans has grown from 257 percentage points in 1965 to 1939 percentage points in 2007.162 As
160. Average maximum permissible annual percentage rates provide a
somewhat less statistically useful picture. The 1965 national mean was a
somewhat misleading 51.7% annual percentage rate. The 1965 national mean
was strongly influenced by five outlier states that allowed unusually large
one-time fees at origination. These states included Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. Calculating a national average for 2007
is not meaningful because of the nine states that have no limit whatsoever. In
these states, presumably the legal maxima are infinite. Because an average
gives equal weight to outlying observations, the current national average maximum legal annual percentage rate on typical payday loans is also infinite.
161. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (to be codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b)).
162. See infra app. tbls.5 & 6. Statisticians calculate range by subtracting
the smallest observation from the largest observation of a given variable.
ALAN AGRESTI & CHRISTINE FRANKLIN, STATISTICS: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF

1143

USURY LAW

20081

illustrated in side-by-side box plots in Figure 2, infra, the 25th
percentile in an ordering of maximum permissible state usury
limits on typical payday loans grew six times over from 30% to
183%.163 The 75th percentile grew more than twelve times over
from 37% to 460%.164 Statisticians sometimes look to the interquartile range of a set of observations to determine how compressed those observations are. Interquartile range is simply
the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile. Figure 2 graphically illustrates interquartile range by including the twenty-five state usury limits that fall within this
range inside the shaded box for both years. In 1965 the interquartile range was only 7 percentage points. In 2007 the interquartile range of maximum permissible annual percentage
rates on typical payday loans had grown to 277 percentage
points. Thus, the prices allowed by 1965 usury laws were far
more concentrated than those permitted today.
Figure 2.
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Where possible, statisticians also prefer to describe the
spread of data with a measurement of standard deviation.
Standard deviation measures the typical distance from the
mean for a given set of observations. 165 While a standard deviation of 1965 law is readily figured, calculating a standard deviation of 2007 maximum permissible annual percentage rates on
typical payday loans requires a further assumption. Because
currently seven states have no limit on credit prices whatsoever
(an infinite cap), a standard deviation for all states would provide a meaninglessly distorted measure of spread. Still, excluding states with unlimited prices gives a conservative, lowerbound measure of the standard deviation. Given this conservative measure, the standard deviation of the maximum permissible annual percentage rates on typical payday loans for the
forty-three usury-limited states increased to 302 in 2007, up
from only 57.3 in 1965.166

What is the significance of these findings? This decompression of state credit price maxima further illustrates the shattered national consensus on usury law. But perhaps more interestingly, this finding shows that state legislatures have not
been able to find a principled method of capping prices. In
1965, whether they were right or wrong in doing so, the vast
majority of state legislatures loosely agreed about the point at
which credit prices become antisocial. Today, the law evidences
no such agreement. At least those states that have no usury
limits whatsoever can point to the neoclassical Benthemite arguments against the paternalism of government intervention in
the marketplace. In contrast, what is the commercially justifiable reason why Montana lenders need an annual percentage
rate of 652% to run a profitable business while nearby in Washington, lenders can get by on 392%? Why should short-term
lenders in Massachusetts need special fees amounting to an
annual percentage rate of 183% on a typical payday loan when
lenders in Connecticut are only allowed 17%? Is there something beyond the fait accompli of raw political power that justi165.

Standard deviation is the square root of the variance in a set of obser-

vations. Variance, in turn, is the average of the squared deviations from a
mean. Standard deviation is expressed as
=Y

(x.

_P,2

N
See ARGESTI & FRANKLIN, supra note 162, at 57-58 for a helpful introduction.
166.

See supra fig.2.
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fies what governments have done to the traditional American
notion of commercial law and order? These empirical findings
demand that an intellectually responsible defense of the current usury law include a principled answer to these questions.
C. USURY LAW HAS BECOME MORE MISLEADING
While there is now tremendous variety in the actual annual percentage rates allowed by state law, there is far less variety in the numbers most prominently featured within usury
statutes. This is to say that the numerical language chosen by
state legislatures to cap credit prices does not transparently reflect the regulatory environment it produces. This Section explains that although legislatures have raised usury limits, they
have simultaneously changed the method of capping prices to
continue to describe those higher prices with roughly the same
smaller numbers used back in 1965. For those who read legislation, such as journalists, advocates, legislative staffers, and legislators themselves, legal limits on credit prices have become
more misleading.
Table 4, infra, divides all state usury laws for 1965 and
2007 into classes based on how each statute goes about limiting
prices with (1) a simple nominal interest rate limit; (2) an addon interest rate limit; (3) a discount interest rate limit; (4) a
specified dollar amount; (5) a percentage limit on the amount
financed; (6) a percentage limit on the proportion of the total of
payments; or (7) no limit at all. The letter n represents the
number of states using each method. Next, the table provides
an average of the most prominent, or salient, number featured
in the language of each state law for each type of cap. In both
1965 and 2007, these average salient numbers all fall within a
relatively tight compression. Average salient numbers for each
type of limit type fall between 15 and 43-numbers similar to
the simple nominal annual interest rates generally used in old
Ham-era small-loan laws. Yet, the mean of salient numbers in
usury statutes do not rise appreciably along with the average
permissible annual percentage rate allowed under each statute.
For example, in 2007 the average number written by state legislatures that cap prices in proportion to a borrowers' total of
payments is 15. This is true, even though these same state legislatures currently tolerate typical payday loans at about 452%
annual percentage rate. Nationwide, the forty-three state legislatures that cap credit prices currently choose to describe their
price limitation with numbers averaging out to eighteen. How-
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ever, if these same price limits are described in the context of a
typical payday loan, using the federal price disclosure terminology, the average number produced is 358%.
Table 4. Salience Distortion by Usury Limit Type, 1965 & 2007
1965

2007

E)

z

35

5

34

29

10

21

116

121

Add-on

7

15

70

55

1

17

17

0

Discount

7

8

123

115

2

10

157

147

Fee Schedule

1

2

47

45

2

28

221

193

Amount
Financed (%)
Total

0

-

-

-

17

19

500

481"

0

-

-

-

11

15

452

437

0
50

n/a
17

n/a
58

r/a
45

7
50

n/a
18

n/a
358

n/a

Smpl. Nmnl.

Payment (%)I
Unlimited
TOTAL

Mean excludes states with unlimited permissible rates.

Salience distortion, the new scale variable this study proposes, describes the difference between price-limiting numbers
chosen by state legislatures and the actual annual percentage
rates those numbers allow. For example, the state with the
highest salient distortion in the country for the typical payday
loan studied was Montana. The Montana legislature chose to
cap payday loan prices by limiting the finance charge to 25% of
the loan's principal. 167 Seemingly similar, the New York legislature has capped loan finance charges at an interest rate of
25%. 6 Both states feature the number 25. New York's noexception, simple, nominal, annual cap does
in fact limit the
permissible annual percentage rate to 25%. 169 In stark contrast,
the Montana statute tolerates payday loans where the finance

charge grows to a quarter of the original principal after only
two weeks-an annual percentage rate of about 652% on a typi-

167. MONT.CODErANN.§ 31-1-722 (2007).
168. N.Y.PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 1999).

169. Id.
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cal payday loan. 170 While the salience distortion in New York is
zero, Montana's salience distortion is 627.
Figure 3. Mean Salient Number and Distortion in State
Usury Limits on Typical Payday Loans, 1965 & 2007
363

400
300
200
100

45

0
1965
E Mean Salient Number

2007
ElMean Salience Distortion

Replicating this analysis nationwide leads to an inescapable and profound conclusion: the salience distortion of state
usury limits has grown significantly. Figure 3 shows the mean
salient number at which state legislatures have chosen to cap
payday loan prices alongside the salience distortion associated
with that number. From 1965 to 2007 there was a slight increase in the mean salient number used in state price caps on
typical payday loans. However, the extent to which that number understates typical payday loan pricing relative to the federal annual percentage rate measurement has grown to an average of 363 percentage points.
Figure 4, infra, makes a similar point in a slightly different
way. This scatter plot illustrates the strong correlation between
permissible annual percentage rates and salience distortion.
This chart plots the maximum annual percentage rate for every
state price cap included in this study along the Y-axis. The Xaxis tracks the salience distortion score assigned to these same
statutes. For every usury law studied in both 1965 and 2007, as
the price permitted by the legislature rises, so too does the severity with which those legislatures mislead about the actual
cost of the allowed loans. Statisticians usually measure the correlation of two scale variables with a statistic known as the
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. 17 1 Pearson's
Correlation is a way of summarizing the strength of a linear re170.
171.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-722.
See ARGESTI & FRANKLIN, supra note 162, at 103-05.
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lationship between two variables with a single figure that
ranges between -1 and +1.172 The stronger the relationship between the variables the closer the correlation figure is to ±1.
With a correlation value of 0.998, Figure 4's scatter plot of the
relationship between permissible annual percentage rates and
salience distortion shows a virtually certain positive correlation. What exactly does this mean? In both 1965 and 2007, high
price caps were always described with small numbers. This
analysis suggests that the higher the payday loan price limit a
state chooses, the more misleading that state was in the language it used to create the limit.
Figore 4. Scatterplot of Maximun Annual Percentage Rates vs. Salience Distortion of
All State Usury Linits for Typical Payday Loans, 1965 & 2007
700% -

600%_
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172.

Pearson's Correlation is represented as:

where r is the correlative value, n is the number of observations, x is the salience distortion value for a statute, y is the annual percentage rate for a statute, and s represents the standard deviations for each variable. For further
explanation of these concepts, see id.
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While this linear relationship between price and distortion
is apparent from even a casual glance at Figure 3, it is important to remember there is nothing inherent in the nature of
credit or usury law that predetermines the strength of correlation between these two variables. If, for example, a state legislature chose to allow payday loans with a 500% annual percentage rate, that legislature could choose to describe that price
limit with the number 500. A state that did this would have a
salience distortion of zero, placing it by itself in the far upper
left corner of Figure 4.173 Indeed using the same methods to
create a scatter plot of the usury laws of the thirteen founding
American states would suggest no meaningful correlation because none of those state laws saliently distorted. This is to say
that the number featured in each state's colonial statute was
roughly the same number as the annual percentage rate of the
most expensive permissible loan. The strength of the Pearson's
correlation in Figure 4 merely reflects a simple fact: many
states have chosen to elevate their permissible prices; but no
states chose to elevate their description of permissible prices. If
even a few states had chosen to express credit prices in ways
mathematically comparable to Regulation Z, the Pearson's correlation between the maximum permissible annual percentage
rate of state usury laws and the salience distortion of those
laws would plunge. This chart is a graphic representation of
the fact that in the history of our republic, no state legislature
willing to cap loan prices at over 300% has ever had the courage of conviction to transparently describe this choice with a
price figure reflective of the true annual percentage rate. Since
1965 the typical American state legislature has passed laws
driving up maximum credit prices while attempting to appear
otherwise.
IV. ANALYSIS
These findings give rise to three intellectual contributions:
(1) a cultural point regarding the way American society perceives the ethical boundaries of credit pricing; (2) a behavioral173. Similarly, if a state wanted to, it could create a price cap generating a
low annual percentage rate but describing that rate with a high number. A
maximum interest per century, for example, could accomplish exactly this.

This would place the state in the bottom right corner of the chart with a low
annual percentage rate and a high salience distortion. Ironically, I am aware

of no state that has ever overemphasized its usury limit. Apparently there is
no political capital to be gained from aggressively regulating while pretending
you are not.
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economic point exploring how payday lending legislation may
exploit bounded rationality; and (3) a political point concerning
the appropriate level of government from which to regulate
credit pricing.
A. SOCIAL NORMS OF COMMERCIAL MORALITY AND THE
MYTHOLOGY OF CREDIT PRICING
First, a cultural point: legislatures have chosen the numeric language in American usury laws because those numbers
sound in an ancient moral folk-wisdom on the tolerability of interest rates. 174 Policy makers, the press, and the American
people understand the morality and advisability of credit prices
through a lens created by the decisions of religious, political,
and cultural leaders of our historical tradition. Today's legislatures refuse to use numbers transparently reflective of actual
credit prices because to do so would put them in contention
with the moral wisdom of people like Pope Paul II, Martin
Luther, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Ham. 175 Each of these
individuals led their people on credit issues at transformative
cultural moments. In doing so, each sanctioned annual interest
rates, as this concept is generally understood, at between 6%
and 36%. Our society has imbued numbers within this range
with a moral authority-a mythology of sorts-when these
numbers reference the price of loans. Legislatures deploying
these numbers in price caps that authorize triple-digit interest
rates perpetuate something of a legislative fraud against those
Americans (and there are many) who have trouble recognizing
the difference.
Using numbers within a range of 6 to 36 to create tripledigit annual percentage rate price limits of 300% or more insulates legislatures from the political fallout of their decision.
Usury law in general, and payday lending regulation in partic176
ular always make for hotly contested, controversial bills.
This type of legislation tends to live or die in the final moments
of legislative cycles and subject to the most bare-knuckle political tactics. 177 Legislatures that adopt usury laws so completely
at odds with ancient moral visionaries and longstanding legal
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See discussion supra Part II.
176. See Baylor, supra note 3; Frank, supra note 3; Teegardin, supra note
3; Wenske, supra note 3.
177. See, e.g., Chris Flores, Whistle-Blowers Suing Payday Lender, NEWPORT NEWS DAILY PRESS (Va.), Oct. 27, 2007, at Al.
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traditions are understandably nervous. Hiding the import of
that legislation within misleading language has proven too
tempting for many state legislatures to pass up. Like guilty
children sweeping a broken vase under the sofa, a majority of
American state legislatures have adopted fundamentally mis178
leading mechanisms for limiting credit prices.
Arkansas provides a particularly poignant example. In
1965 Arkansas courts strictly enforced the simple nominal annual interest rate cap of 10% included in the Arkansas State
Constitution. 1 79 Currently the Arkansas legislature has
adopted a statute that purports to allow 10% of the face value
of a payday loan check, plus an additional fee of $10.180 While
the current statute just echoes the number 10, the actual price
difference for a typical payday loan is an annual percentage rate of about 10% versus an annual percentage rate of 423.40%
for each time period.18 1 What is perhaps even more troubling is
that subsequent to 1965, the people of Arkansas recognized
that a true 10% limit is too low, and amended the constitution
to limit simple nominal annual interest rates to a more reasonable 17% per annum. 182 Admirably stating the legally obvious,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that the current state
payday lending authorization statute is unconstitutional and
contrary to the will of the people of Arkansas. 18 3 Defying its
own Supreme Court, the Arkansas Legislature, with the collusion of state regulators, has facilitated evasion of its own Constitution, siding instead with the well-funded payday lending
178. Twenty-four states' credit price limits create a disparity of over 350
percentage points between the actual annual percentage rate of their most expensive permitted payday loan and the number featured in the statute. These
states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See infra app. tbl.6. Based on
the methodology of this study, an additional three states can be said to distort
their true price limit on a typical payday loan by 250 to 350 percentage points.
These states include Florida, Iowa, and Ohio. See infra app. tbl.6.
179. See Kenneth E. Galchus et al., A History of Usury Law in Arkansas:
1836-1990, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 695, 699-701 (1990).

180. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-104 (Supp. 2007).
181. See infra app. tbl.6.
182. See ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13.
183. See Luebbers v. Money Store, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ark. 2001)
("[T]he mere fact that the transaction has been given a certain form by the
General Assembly will not exempt it from the scrutiny of the court, which is
bound to exercise its judgment in determining whether or not the form of the
transaction is a device to cover usury.").
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industry lobby. Hundreds of Arkansas payday lenders now
openly charge predatory prices in violation of the state consti18 4

tution.

Special mention should also be made of unusual loopholes
in Texas and Florida. Both of these states have legislation that
purports to place modest limits on th2 prices of typical payday
loans.'8 5 What makes these states unusual are obscure statutes
that authorize companies called "Credit Service Organizations"
to take fees in exchange for brokering loans from other companies. 8 6 Under these statutes, payday lenders partner with
anonymous third-party companies (which likely have close ties
to the payday lender itself) to make payday loans outside the
scope of state price limits.

8 7

In these arrangements the under-

lying loan itself generally complies with state law, but the companies also assess a brokering fee that generates a price that is
far in excess of the usury limit. 8 8 As a result, many payday

lenders in Florida, and virtually the entire industry in Texas,
simply ignore the price limits in state law by generating the
184. See ARKANSANS AGAINST ABUSIVE PAYDAY LENDING, PAYDAY LENDERS IN ARKANSAS: THE REGULATED AND UNREGULATED 3 (2006), http://www

.stoppaydaypredators.orgpdfs/news%20articles/06_0200_PaydayUStudy
.pdf; Jason Wiest, Without Legislation, Payday Lending Battle Shifts Back to
Court, ARK. NEWS BUREAU, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.arkansasnews.com
archive/2007/04/1 1/News/341687.html.
185. Texas has not passed a separate usury statute granting licensed payday lenders authority to charge fees unique to payday loans. Accordingly, payday lenders in Texas are subject to the state's traditional small-loan law that
limits interest rates at 48% per annum, plus an additional loan "acquisition"
fee of up to $10 per loan-generating an annual percentage rate of 128% on a
typical payday loan. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.501 (2007); TEX. FIN. CODE
ANN. § 342.201 (Vernon Supp. 2007); see also Foreclosure,PredatoryLending,
and Payday Lending in America's Cities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Domestic Reform, 110th
Cong. (2007) (written testimony of Jean Ann Fox, Director of Consumer Protection, Consumer Federation of America Consumers Union), available at
http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20070323 14372293666.pdf (stating that Texas has a small-loan rate cap of 48% annual interest). Florida has adopted a licensing statute for payday lenders that includes a
price limit of 10% of the advance plus a "verification fee" of no more than five
dollars-generating an annual percentage rate on a typical loan of about
300%. See FLA. STAT. § 560.404(6) (2007).
186. See FLA. STAT. § 817.7001(2)(a)(2); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 393.201.
187. See Baylor, supra note 3; Richard Burnett, Some Payday Lenders
Flout State's Reform Law: They Say the Law Doesn't Apply Because They Are
Exempt or Peddle Loans via the Web, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 1, 2007, at Al;
Pamela Yip, Tightening Payday Lending Loopholes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Mar. 5, 2007, at 1D.
188. See Burnett, supranote 187.
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bulk of their revenue from fees nominally associated with brokering, but functionally identical to interest.18 9 While this
study evaluated Florida and Texas price limits based on their
plain meaning, in reality these two states should be considered
in a class similar to Delaware, South Dakota, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and other states that have no price limits on payday
loans whatsoever. 190

Ironically, many of the state legislatures that surreptitiously authorize triple-digit interest rate payday lending also
adopt statutory provisions requiring that payday lenders follow
the uniform price disclosure conventions of the TILA.191 As a
legal matter, these rules are pointless since payday lenders
must comply with the federal law anyway. 192 But, such provisions are not culturally pointless. Passing a law that is merely
duplicative of some preexisting rule is a classic legislative tactic
used to look like you are doing something when you are not.
Legislators that want to pretend to address payday lender
abuses need to fill up their bills with something. What is so
particularly insincere about these provisions is that they remind payday lenders to use accurate price disclosure when
dealing with consumers, while at the same time these legislators ignore those conventions when talking to the press.
B. LEGISLATIVE EXPLOITATION OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY:
FRAMING EFFECTS AND ANCHORING IN USURY LAW

Legislative decisions to express credit price caps with relatively small numbers take advantage of the bounded rationality
of readers, including potential critics, of those statutes. Two
cognitive distortions, framing effects and anchoring, are particularly relevant. With respect to the former, psychologists and
behavioral economists have presented compelling evidence that
the way financial information is presented, or "framed," can
profoundly and predictably influence human choices. 193 For ex189. See Baylor, supra note 3; Burnett, supra note 187; Yip, supra note
187.
190. See infra app. tbl.6.
191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 560.404(13) ("For each deferred presentment
transaction, the deferred presentment provider must comply with the disclosure requirements of 12 C.F.R., part 226, the federal TILA, and Regulation Z
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.").
192. See Official Staff Commentary on the Truth-in-Lending Act, 65 Fed.
Reg. 17,129, 17,130 (Mar. 31, 2000) (stating that payday lenders must comply
with the Truth-in-Lending Act).
193. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the
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ample, people are more averse to medical treatments when
identical risk data is framed as a mortality rate than when it is
framed as a survival rate. 194 Consumers treat identical investment risks differently depending on whether they are presented as a gamble or insurance. 195 Moreover, "[i]ndividuals
will perceive a penalty for using credit cards as a loss and a bonus for using cash as a gain; this will lead individuals to use
cash if and only if the 'penalty' tack is taken, although the two
situations are, from an economic and end-state perspective,
96
identical."1
Similarly, there is no objective mathematical difference between a typical payday loan limited in price with a 391% annual percentage rate cap and one limited with a cap of 15% of
the loan principal. Both expressions limit the finance charge on
a two-week loan of $325 to about $48.75. But, the empirical
findings in this study strongly suggest there is a profound difference in the way these two numerical expressions are understood. The fact that not a single legislature chose to describe
this functionally identical price limitation using an annual percentage rate (which is, after all, the federal national standard)
suggests that legislatures are aware that the annual percentage rate cap is perceived as higher than the amount financed
cap.
Furthermore, behavioral economic research has demonstrated an "anchoring" effect that leads to a closely related observation. People tend to rely too heavily on first impressions
when assessing risk and value. 197 This is to say, we tend to
"anchor" on early estimates and fail to sufficiently revise our
perception of price or risk when further information comes to

Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
194. See Barbara J. McNiel et al., On the Elicitationof Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1259-62 (1982); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions,
59 J. Bus. S251, S254-55 (1986).
195. See John C. Hershey & Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis, 47 J. RISK
& INS. 111, 126 (1980).
196. Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives
on Pain and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMIcS 259, 262
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see also Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive
Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 45 (1980) (discuss-

ing the "opportunity costs" of using credit cards).
197. See Mathew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First ImpressionsMatter: A Model of ConfirmatoryBias, 114

Q.J. ECON.

37, 68-72 (1999).
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light. 198 Research suggests anchoring on the early estimate of
the value of a lawsuit tends to disrupt later settlement negotiation. 199 Even accountants conducting audits anchor on early estimates and insufficiently correct their judgments. 20 0 Marketing professionals
have
absorbed
these
lessons
and
systematically design sales tactics to exploit this pattern in
20 1
judgment making.
Perhaps then we should not be too surprised if legislatures
have taken to the same strategy. The empirical findings in this
Article suggest that legislatures use small numbers in usury
legislation to frame the public debate and comprehension of the
law to their political advantage. By proposing legislation with,
for example, a price limit of 15% of the amount financed, legislators anchor the perception of their opponents, the press, consumer advocates, and the public. Everyone that reads the price
cap will initially anchor on a price expression that underemphasizes cost. As further investigation of the financial significance of such a limit comes to light, that new information must
psychologically contend with the earlier label. For those who
lack the financial expertise to easily distinguish the tremendous mathematical difference between a cap proportional to a
loan principal and a traditional interest-rate cap, the true value of a price limit becomes obscured and thus less objectionable.
C. FEDERALISM AND THE COMPLIANCE COSTS OF USURY LAW
A final insight raised by these findings speaks to the nature of our federal system and the continuing debate over the
198. See Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under
Ambiguity, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY 41, 46-48 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987);

Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes
of Judgment and Choice, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 53, 78-80 (1981); Robin M.
Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of
Judgmental Heuristics, 90 PSYCHOL. BUL. 197, 197-211 (1981); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 45, 54-55 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995); Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of
Economics, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 137, 152 (Richard H. Thaler ed.,
1991); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 11, at 1124-31.
199. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 198, at 47.
200. William R. Kinney, Jr. & Wilfred C. Uecker, Mitigating the Consequences of Anchoring in Auditor Judgments, 57 ACCT. REV. 55, 55--56 (1982).
201. See generally Brian Wansink et al., An Anchoring and Adjustment
Model of Purchase Quantity Decisions, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 71 (1998) (discussing how marketing professionals can utilize the anchoring model).
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appropriate level of government to address predatory lending
policy. Our federal system of government has placed policy
makers, judges, advocates, and scholars in the position of periodically revaluating whether the federal, state, or local governments should make decisions on consumer policy. In recent
years the general trend of banking industry sentiment has favored national policymaking. 20 2 The rationale usually given is
that nonuniform state policymaking imposes a higher regulatory compliance cost than justified by its benefits. 203 In this view,
designing loan products compliant with fifty different regulatory environments is simply too complex. 20 4 While there is clearly
merit to this argument, this study hints at a slightly more interesting, nuanced view of the costs of compliance-at least
with respect to usury law.
State government choices about the level at which to set a
price limit do not by themselves impose significant compliance
costs. Under the federal TILA and, more fundamentally, as a
matter of basic accounting, all lenders must calculate the cost
of their loans. 20 5 Recognizing whether a particular loan exceeds
a legal limit is accomplished at a glance. Rather, what creates
high compliance costs is the tremendous and ambiguous variety
of methods of calculating price caps. While this study identified
six different ways that state legislatures cap prices, it is by no
means a simple task to recognize which method a legislature
has chosen. Moreover, there are many significant exceptions in
different jurisdictions for special fees, or types of lenders within
these basic classes of usury limits. For each methodology and
each exception there are frequently questions left unanswered
by the statute forcing regulators and courts to guess at legislative intent. The result is that each state is forced to develop its
own unique and robust jurisprudence of credit pricing. Understanding and complying with these different bodies of law

202. Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting off More Than
They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 525-27 (2007); Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a
Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,23 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 246-52 (2004).
203. Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and Federal Banking Agency Responses to Predatory Lending, 59 BUS. LAW. 1193,
1193 (2004).
204. Id.
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000).

2008]

USURY LAW

1157

created by the variety of usury law methodologies is complicated and time consuming.
Perhaps these methodological choices would be justified if
they were necessary to effectuate some important government
purpose-in this case the protection of vulnerable consumer
borrowers. But, from a consumer perspective, what is important is not the method by which a cap is set, but rather the extent to which that cap constrains inefficiency in the market.
The point here is that the characteristics of state usury law
that create high compliance costs are not those characteristics
that protect consumers. As creditors have fought for authorization to charge higher and higher prices, each state legislature
has pushed a costly regulatory apparatus that conceals their
efforts to raise permissible credit prices. As a matter of political
reality, adoption of lax usury limits led legislators to turn to
misleading accounting methodology, which in turn raised compliance costs for creditors. 206 The counterintuitive irony is that
high cost lenders actually advocated for the very exceptions and
loopholes that have raised the compliance costs associated with
nonuniform state policymaking. 207 The current design of credit
price limits is not only misleading, but compliance is also unnecessarily expensive.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
While the American consumer credit regulatory system is
in need of many reforms, this Article most directly argues in
favor of three policy recommendations. First, legislators should
write usury laws in annual percentage rate format. This is to
say, in the twenty-first century our consumer-credit usury law
and disclosure law should be linked. The same policy arguments that led reformers in the 1960s to create a uniform method of disclosing loan prices apply, perhaps with even more
force, in the context of usury limits. The variety of methodologies used to express price limits has left the door open to those
who wish to mislead the public and the press on the true meaning of credit price limits with a variety of confusing and counterintuitive pricing methodologies. Moreover, these various me206. Donald C. Lampe, Wrong from the Start? North Carolina's 'Predatory
Lending" Law and the Practice vs. Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 13839 (2004); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the DeregulatoryAgenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (2005).
207. See, e.g., SHOW ME THE MONEY, supra note 74, at 15-21 (describing
payday lender lobbying efforts in Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin).
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thodologies have imposed unnecessary costs of compliance on
well-meaning creditors with little or no consumer protection
provided as a result. While there is no disputing the fact that
federal truth-in-lending regulations include some significant
loopholes and exceptions, these problems pale in comparison to
the legal charades found in a majority of state credit price limitations. 20 8 Particularly troubling have been those states which
have delinked credit price limits from time. Price limits expressed as a percent of the principal loaned or the amount to be
repaid are poor methods of limiting credit prices because they
ignore the most important variable in the true cost of credit:
time.
Some have argued that annual percentage rates are not
meaningful in the context of payday loans because these loans
are intended as a short term form of credit. 20 9 These critics
generally assert that payday loans are more easily compared
with a dollar amount. 210 There is no empirical evidence, however, to support this claim. Moreover, while focusing on a dollar
amount might simplify comparison of one payday loan to
another payday loan, it confuses the more important price comparison to other types of debt such as credit cards, pawnshop
loans, home mortgages, and personal loans from finance com-

208. One particularly important loophole that needs attention lies in the
relationship between noncontingent administrative fees and the finance
charge in open-end credit. In open-end loans, the finance charge cannot be calculated in advance because neither the lender nor the borrower knows how
much the money will be advanced ahead of time. Currently, Regulation Z requires disclosure of the annual percentage rate that will be applied to balances
incurred by the borrower. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17, 226.18 (2007). But fees,
such as annual participation fees are not included in the annual percentage
rate, even though these fees meet the classic expression of a finance charge: a
cost incident to the extension of credit. See id. The potential loophole is this: if
the usury limit is expressed as an annual percentage rate, could payday lenders restructure debts as open end loans and then charge large administrative
fees which are not included within the usury limit? The answer is that along
with usury limits expressed as annual percentage rates, legislatures, regulators, and courts must vigilantly guard against sham transactions designed to
avoid the price limit. This, of course, has always been the challenge with usury
law. See, e.g., Sanford v. Hawthorne, 174 N.W. 863, 864 (Neb. 1919). One possible solution might be requiring an annual statement period where lenders are
required to rebate any money collected in excess of 36% of the amount of credit
actually extended to the borrower. Over the course of a year, a lender would
not be allowed to charge more in noncontingent fees and interest than 36% of
the actual credit extended to the consumer. If administrative fees pushed this
rate over the cap, then the lender would be required to rebate the excess fees.
209. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 903 n.242.
210. Id.
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panies, banks, or credit unions. Annual percentage rates are
the yardstick our society uses to express loan prices. Using one
yardstick for mainstream loans, such as mortgages and credit
cards, and another yardstick for payday loans creates a dangerous opportunity to mislead borrowers. Too many consumers
cannot easily distinguish a 15% annual percentage rate on a
credit card and a payday loan with a payment of 15% of the
amount borrowed (which carries an annual percentage rate of
about 391% in a typical loan). Furthermore, to the extent that
comparison of a dollar amount is useful for payday loan borrowers, the TILA facilitates exactly this with a finance charge
disclosure. 2 11 Consumers are already entitled to disclosure of a
dollar amount. 2 12 Even still, policy makers must recognize that
despite consumers' intentions, payday loans are long term
forms of credit. Consumers that resort to payday loans over the
course of their lives and consumers that are trapped by high
payday loan prices do use payday loans over the course of
years, making annual percentage rates a fundamentally appropriate measure of cost. Finally, independent of payday loan
borrowers themselves, the expression of usury limits in our law
should reflect our national tradition of expressing credit prices
in a nominal annual format. Throughout the history of our republic, credit prices have most commonly been understood in a
nominal annual interest rate format. Departing from this tradition has frustrated the ability of the press and the voting public
to understand the law and to exercise their will. Indeed, that
was probably the point.
Second, we should reestablish traditional usury limits of no
higher than 36% annual percentage rate. Liberal economists
condemned credit price restrictions asserting that they inefficiently prohibit mutually beneficial transactions. 213 In this
view, demand for usurious credit will fund a black market that
charges higher prices to insure against the risk of being caught
and that specializes in violence. 214 Counterarguments include
the assertion that borrowers are not receiving mutually beneficial exchange because they lack sufficient information, are irrationally discounting the value of future wealth, or are simply
211.
212.

12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17, 226.18.
15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2000).

213. JEREMY BENTHAM, DEFENCE OF USURY: SHEWING THE IMPOLICY OF
THE PRESENT LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE TERMS OF PECUNIARY BARGAINS 1-5

(Routledge/Thoemmes Press 1998) (1787).
214.

BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 374-402 (Thomas

Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing Co. 1962) (1752).
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suspending rational price comparison because of desperate circumstances. 215 Usury law apologists also argue that many borrowers willing to borrow from nonviolent legal lenders may be
unwilling or unable to borrow in a black market, decreasing the
volume of usurious loans to the point that gains from the rule
outstrip utility losses. Usury limits may also provide strong
signaling effects that improve borrower shopping behavior.
216
Usury limits may provide a rough form of social insurance.
Usury limits provide a moral compass protecting creditors from
their own avarice. 21 7 And, usurious loans may have significant
externalities not reduced by rational bargaining where it does
exist. 2 18 This debate is, of course, at least several hundred
years old.
What this study adds to that debate is a vivid aide memoire of the law as it was throughout all but the most recent
few years in American history. One cannot be an ardent advocate of unregulated credit pricing and also unapologetically eulogize the founding fathers of our nation. Each of the signatories to the Declaration of Independence and every delegate at
the U.S. Constitutional Conventions returned home to states
with meaningful usury law. 219 The "greatest generation" weathered the Great Depression and the Second World War with
usury limits in place. 220 And the sustained economic growth
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, including extensive consumer
finance of a host of goods and services, took place in a usurylimited credit market. 221 The snapshot of usury law in 1965
provided by this study should serve as a reminder that not long
ago every state in the nation limited credit prices well below
our current national median limit. The fact that legislatures
215. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 133, at 156-98.
216. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a
Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Law, 41
J.L. & Econ. 1, 1 (1998).
217. JOHN WHIPPLE, FREE TRADE IN MONEY 30-32 (Boston, Dayton &
Wentworth 1855).
218. PETERSON, supra note 133, at 199-214.
219. See supra tbl.1.
220. See generally BROKAW, supra note 116 passim.
221. Compare Nicholas Crafts, Economic Growth in the Twentieth Century,
15 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 18, 27-28 (1999) (characterizing mid-twentieth
century U.S. growth as a "'golden age' of outstanding growth performance"),
with Elliot Zupnick, Consumer Credit and Monetary Policy in the United
States and the United Kingdom, 17 J. FIN. 342, 342-43 (1962) (arguing that
"spectacular" growth in consumer credit in the mid-twentieth century would
dilute the effectiveness of monetary policy).
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were only able to raise usury limits through misleading methods is one additional argument for the merits of traditional
usury law. From a historical perspective a 36% annual percentage rate price limit-the 1965 national median-strikes a reasonable compromise in the age-old usury law debate.
Finally, usury limits should apply to all lenders irrespective of their mission, charter, or ownership. While the Russell
Sage-era small-loan laws succeeded in inducing mainstream
creditors into the consumer lending market, the legacy of these
special usury laws has become a patchwork of exceptions, subterfuge, and disrepair. 222 State after state now retains skeletons of usury law stripped bare by federal preemption, state
legislative exceptions, and regulatory neglect. The all too common maze of general usury laws (both constitutional and statutory), small- loan usury laws, special retail installment loan
usury laws, motor vehicle financing usury laws, industrial loan
act usury laws, pawnbroker usury limits, parity statutes, and
deferred presentment acts serves no one's interests. The bedrock principal of equal treatment under the law suggests that
states should adopt, and the federal government should facilitate, more transparent usury legislation. Old special usury limits applicable only to one licensed class of lenders or another
should be cleared out and replaced with a single, clear limit applicable equally to all.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents an empirical analysis of prices tolerated by all fifty state usury laws in both 1965 and 2007. The
study calculated the highest permissible price of a typical payday loan for each state and time period and then expressed
these prices as annual percentage rates following federal TILA
guidelines. Moreover, this study proposes a new statistical concept, labeled salience distortion, to measure the difference between a usury law's maximum annual percentage rate and the
number most prominently featured within the text of each
usury statute. While in this piece salience distortion measures
credit pricing, the theoretical concept could easily be adapted to
study a wide range of legislation. 223 The empirical analysis in
222. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 34, § 2.3.3, at 38-40.
223. Possible future applications of the salience distortion concept could
include analysis of the Environmental Protection Agency's automobile fuel
economy disclosure standards, the description of revenue generated by various
tax laws, and the use of off-budget funding for wars.
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this Article leads to three findings: since 1965 usury law has
become much more lax, more polarized, and more misleading.
This Article argues that with accounting sleight of hand, many
state legislatures now use small, innocuous numbers in usury
laws in an attempt to minimize the public and media outcry
over their decisions to legalize triple-digit interest rate loans.
Abandoning the expression of loan price limits with simple nominal interest rates has allowed legislatures to frame the public debate over usury in a way that understates the recent national departure from the American historical tradition of
aggressive credit price regulation.
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APPENDIX
Table 5. State Usury Limit Data for Inflation-Adjusted Typical
Payday Loans, 1965
State

Cap Type

Finance Total of APR
Charge Payments (%)

($)

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WI
WV
WY

SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
Add On
Discount
SmplNom
Discount
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
Discount
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
Fee Schedule
SmplNom
Add On
SmplNom
Discount
Add On
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
Add On
SmplNom
Add On
Add On
SmplNom
Discount
SmplNom
Add On
SmplNom
SmplNom
Discount
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
SmplNom
Discount
SmplNom
SmplNom

0.72
0.96
0.72
0.20
0.60
0.72
0.34
1.17
0.72
5.36
0.84
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.84
0.72
4.12
0.60
0.60
0.66
0.95
0.53
0.40
0.60
0.70
0.32
0.60
0.72
0.60
0.40
0.60
0.32
3.86
0.72
1.20
0.72
4.16
0.72
0.64
0.38
0.72
0.60
0.60
0.72
4.36
0.72
0.84

($)

53.05
53.29
53.05
52.53
52.93
53.05
52.67
53.50
53.05
57.69
53.17
53.05
53.05
53.05
53.05
53.05
53.05
53.17
53.05
56.45
52.93
52.93
52.99
53.28
52.86
52.73
52.93
53.03
52.65
52.93
53.05
52.93
52.73
52.93
52.65
56.19
53.05
53.53
53.05
56.49
53.05
52.97
52.71
53.05
52.93
52.93
53.05
56.69
53.05
53.17

Salient Salience
Number Distortion

APR
Rank

Salience
Distortion
Rank

35.87
47.83
35.87
9.96
29.89
35.87
16.94
58.29
35.87
267.04
41.85
35.87
35.87
35.87
35.87
35.87
35.87
41.85
35.87
205.26
29.89
29.89
32.88
47.33
26.41
19.93
29.89
34.87
15.94
29.89
35.87
29.89
19.93
29.89
15.94
192.31
35.87
59.79
35.87
207.26
35.87
31.89
18.93
35.87
29.89
29.89
35.87
217.22
35.87
41.85

Note: The following abbreviations appear in this Table 5: (1) SmplNom = simply monthly or annual
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nominal interest rate limit; (2) Add on = Add-on interest rate limit; (3) Discount = discount interest
rate limit; (4) Fee Schedule = specific dollar amount that lenders could charge for loan.

Table 6. State Usury Limit Data for Typical Payday Loans, 2007
State

Cap Type

Finance
Charge

(")

Total of
Payments

APR

(%)

Salient
Number

($)

% of AF

53.75

378.90

432.38
432.38

15

% of TOP
% of TOP
% of TOP
% ofAF
Add On
No Limit
%of AF
Discount
% of TOP
No Limit
% of AF
%of AF
% of TOP
% of AF
% of TOP
% of TOP
Fee Schdl
SmplNom
SmplNom
% of AF
% ofAF
%of TOP
% of AF
% of AF
% of TOP
No Limit
No Limit
SmplNom
%of AF
SmplNom
SmplNom
%of AF
SmplNom
%ofAF
SmplNom
Discount
%of AF
% of TOP
No Limit
Fee Schdl
SmplNom
No Limit
SmplNom
% ofAF
%ofAF
No Limit
SmplNom
% of TOP

57.35
52.78
45.00
61.88
2.11
n/a
37.50
27.35
57.35
n/a
50.38
47.25
41.67
48.75
57.35
45.00
25.00
4.11
22.87
45.00
24.50
71.34
243.75
75.00
57.35
n/a
na
3.73
50.38
3.11
20.74
65.00
48.75
47.50
42.43
11.68
48.75
52.94
ola
30.00
15.98
na
2.24
48.75
48.75
ola
3.86
65.00

382.35
377.78
300.00
386.88
327.11
ola
362.50
352.35
382.35
ola
375.38
372.25
366.67
373.75
382.35
370.00
350.00
329.11
347.87
370.00
349.50
396.34
568.75
375.00
382.35
n/a
ola
328.73
375.38
328.11
345.74
390.00
373.75
372.50
367.43
336.68
373.75
352.94
n/a
355.00
340.98
n/a
354.25
373.75
373.75
n/a
328.86
390.00

460.06
423.40
460.08
496.40
16.93
n/a
*300.82
219.40
460.06
n/a
404.15
379.04
334.28
391.07
460.06
360.99
200.55
32.97
183.46
360.99
196.54
572.29
1955.36
651.79
460.06
n/a
n/a
29.92
404.15
24.95
166.38
521.43
391.07
381.04
153.72
93.70
391.07
460.04
n/a
240.66
*128.19
n/a
17.97
391.07
391.07
n/a
30.96
521.43

15
10
15
20
17
ola
10
10
15
ola
15.5
15
10
15
15
16.75
25
2.75
23
14
6
18
75
25
15
ola
ola
30
15.5
25
36
20
5
15
36
9.5
15
15
n/a
30
4
ola
18
15
15
ola
31
20

% of AF

53.75

Salience APR Salience
Distortion Rank Distortion

378.90

15

Note: The following abbreviations appear in this table: (1) SmplNom = simple nominal interest rate
limit; (2) Add On = add-on interest rate limit; (3) Discount = discount interest rate limit; (4) % of AF =
percentage limit on the amount financed; (5) %of TOP = percentage limit on the proportion of the total
of payments; (6) No limit = No limit at all.
*Florida and Texas annual percentage rate figures do not reflect unlimited Credit Service Organization brokerage fees currently common in those states.

